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EDITORIAL

This issue of the *European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research* is published just before the start of the European Football Championship in Belgium and The Netherlands. As all Europeans know, this tournament is one of the main sport events in Europe: a three-week spectacle of sport tension and . . . violence. Although football (for Americans: soccer) always has had some sort of aggressive undertone, over the last 30 years football has been transformed into a troubling sort of criminogenic event.

The eve of the first major sporting event of the millennium is a propitious time to reflect on a problem which has plagued professional football in Europe for the past few decades: crowd disorders and spectator violence. At least three general observations can be made on the subject: football violence is a relatively young phenomenon; violence seems to be related especially to football and not to other sports, so this kind of violence is relatively unknown in Northern America (US and Canada). In this issue, these and other issues of this very complex social phenomenon are analysed and discussed.

The issue opens with an article on the preparations for the Euro 2000 tournament with regards to safety and security problems. Erwin Muller et al. describe the audit-instrument (a `checklist') which was developed to measure the thoroughness and integrity of the schemes. Whether the preparations were successful in controlling hooliganism will be discussed by the same author in the next issue.

*Eric Dunning* endeavours to construct a sociological diagnosis of football hooliganism as a world phenomenon, exploring how far it can be theorised and understood. ‘Football hooliganism’ is a complex and many-sided phenomenon. Dunning, on the basis of data generated via an analysis of English newspaper coverage, examines the definition, incidence, football-related murders, and popular and academic explanations of this worldwide phenomenon. In his view ‘football hooliganism’ is a construct of politicians and the media. As such, it lacks precision and is used to cover a variety of forms of behaviour which take place in more or less directly football-related contexts. Despite these differences, there is substantial consistency between Scottish, Belgian, Dutch, Italian and English findings.

As a basis for further, cross-national research, it is reasonable to hypothesise that the problem is fuelled by the ‘fault-lines’ of particular countries. In England, that means social class and regional inequalities; in Scotland and Northern Ireland, religious sectarianism; in Spain: the linguistic
sub-nationalisms of the Catalans, Castilians, Gallegos and Basques; in Italy, city particularism and perhaps the division between North and South as expressed in the formation of ‘the Northern League’; and in Germany, the relations between East and West and political groups of the left and right.

*Julian V. Roberts and Cynthia J. Benjamin* explore football hooliganism from a North American perspective, and try to find explanations for the relatively low levels of spectator violence compared to Europe. Particular emphasis is placed on comparisons between professional ice hockey in North America and European football. There are a number of complex cultural and contextual variables, which the authors explore in this article. If there are any lessons for Europeans from the North American experience, it would appear to involve facilitating the conditions which make the public expression of spectator violence a socially-inappropriate response to events on the field or encounters with other fans after the game. These conditions include importing the ethos of spectatorship to counter the participant perspective of European football fans.

*Antonio Roversi and Carlo Balestri* outline certain aspects of the current situation of football hooliganism in Italy. The term ‘football hooliganism’ is used to indicate two distinct phenomena. The first one has to do with so-called ‘spectator disorderliness’—which usually occurs within the stadium, and is aimed at the players, referees, linesmen, managers, and trainers. The second one concerns the acts of vandalism and systematic aggression of—in Italy—the ‘ultras’ groups against similar opposing groups both within and outside the stadiums. The authors try to explain the current situation and the most recent changes. The number of incidents in the last years has decreased, but at the same time the sort of violence has changed: it turns against the police; it declines into pure vandalism and juvenile deviance. An important moment was the crisis caused by the death of an ultras in 1995; it marked a turning point between the ‘old way’ of the ultras and the new developments.

On the basis of eight football seasons—a total of 5,180 matches in the Belgian First and Second Division—*Stéfan de Vreese* reports on the phenomenon of hooliganism in Belgium. After the Heizel tragedy in 1985 the police began gathering statistical data on football matches. From these data information can be gathered on measures for making the stadiums more secure. The Belgian hardcore elements and the specific problems they cause can be better identified. In this way a risk analysis of each match can be made beforehand in order to anticipate actual problems in and around the stadiums.

In the Current Issues section, *Ron van Kaam and Karla van Leeuwen* describe the background and aims of the International Victimology Website,
an initiative of the United Nations, the World Society of Victimology and the Research and Documentation Centre (WODC) of the Dutch Ministry of Justice.

J.C.J.B.

Themes in preparation:
Police Powers and Accountability in a Democratic Society
Sexual Delinquency
Migration and Crime

Suggestions and papers are welcomed. See the inside cover for the editorial address and additional information.
ABSTRACT. The Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations commissioned the Crisis Research Center (COT)/University of Leiden to provide a profile of the current status of the organisation of Euro 2000 by compiling two audits. The first audit took place in February 2000. The authors report in this article on the results of this audit. It comprises a content audit (enforcement; arrests and prosecution; supervision, transportation and stay; hospitality) and a process audit (preparation, organisation, information, media and communication, after-phase). The audit framework offers both the researchers and the organisations involved a workable checklist for analysing and implementing the preparations for Euro 2000. In practice, it gives the researchers and the officials the idea that they have considered all the conceivable aspects of organising large-scale events.

KEY WORDS: audit, Euro 2000, hooliganism, prevention policies, risk analyses

The Netherlands is on the eve of the largest sports event it has ever organised: the European Football Championship 2000 (Euro 2000). The weeks to come will be quite tense for many Dutch government officials. Over the last few years, hundreds – and, in recent months, thousands – of civil servants and staff of private organisations have been involved in ensuring that this event has been fully prepared for. The threat of Euro 2000 inducing large-scale riots is a very real nightmare to many people. Everyone can foresee the considerable problems that could be caused by football hooligans or football criminals inspired by this event.

Since the allocation of Euro 2000 to the Netherlands and Belgium, a great many government and private organisations and officials have been involved in preparing for the tournament. Euro 2000 is both on the national political agenda and on the agenda of the political bodies and authorities in the host cities. At national level the co-ordination of the preparations are in the hands of the Dutch Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. Many operational services have already been working on the run-up to Euro 2000 for some time.

The Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations commissioned the Crisis Research Center (COT)/University of Leiden to provide a profile of the current status of the organisation of Euro 2000 by compiling two audits. With the aid of an external second opinion, the minister and the Lower House must be assured that all preparations are running optimally.
The first audit dates from 14 February 2000 and the second is scheduled for publication at the end of April 2000.

This article reports the results of the first audit. This first audit shows the situation as it was on 1 February 2000, which significantly restricts this article. New and more extensive measures were undoubtedly taken by all the government bodies involved in the months that followed 1 February 2000. Because of the date on which this Journal went to press we had to limit ourselves to the first audit. Readers should realise that the facts outlined here could have been superseded since. In order to avoid confusion concerning our description and views of the situation, we frequently cite the original text of the first audit without continuous explicit reference in this article.

The preparations for Euro 2000 were analysed and described on the basis of an audit framework. This audit framework is not simply a context to assist in describing and analysing the preparations but is now being used as a checklist by many of the organisations involved. The audit framework forms an overview of the relevant aspects involved in the organisation and preparation of large-scale events. In this article we focus on the content and structure of the audit framework. The summarised findings of the organisation of Euro 2000 on 1 February 2000 are also given.

AUDIT FRAMEWORK

The audit of the organisation of Euro 2000 fits within the customary views of audits and auditing. It is not only geared to inspecting the current situation but is primarily aimed at giving those involved the opportunity to compare their efforts with those of others. This will focus attention on opportunities for shifting the object of the audit — in this case the organisation of Euro 2000 — to a higher plane. Thus, the findings of the audit are not only significant to the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and the Lower House but also to all involved. The audit framework has been placed at the disposal of all the organisations concerned so that they are optimally informed of the way in which their organisation and way of functioning is portrayed and assessed.

The audit framework with which the audit was implemented is based on an analysis of the available academic literature on crisis management and the organisation of large-scale events (see references). The audit framework has two parts; the first consists of the content audit. This comprises an inspection of the content of the measures aimed at Euro 2000 that are being taken. This primarily concerns the measures taken by many
organisations to prevent major disruptions to public order. Although the preparations for Euro 2000 do not just concern safety, but also include commerce and hospitality, in practice more than 75% of the attention is directed towards safety issues. The content audit concentrated on the following elements:

1. Enforcement
   A. Deployment of existing powers
   B. Policy directives and bounds of tolerance
   C. Supervision
   D. Match attendance bans
   E. Aliens policy
   F. Alcohol and drugs policy
   G. Ticket sales and the black market
   H. Arrests and prosecution

2. Supervision, transportation and stay
   A. Supervision of supporters
   B. Organisation of transport
   C. Organisation of stay

3. Hospitality
   A. Holland Promotion
   B. Events and festivities
   C. The Dutch side at home situation

The second part is the process audit, which is an individual scan of the processes deployed by the organisations and a process scan of the organisation of Euro 2000 as a whole. This process scan takes place for each of the following organisations and underlying project organisations: Ministries of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, of Justice, of Transport, Public Works and Water Management, of Health, Welfare and Sports, of Defence, and of Foreign Affairs; Stichting Euro 2000; National Police Project Euro 2000; the host cities and general police; The Dutch National Security Service; National Police Services; Royal Netherlands Military Constabulary; Provinces; the local authorities; the general and host cities Public Prosecutions Department and the judiciary; the host cities and general organisation for fire brigades, medical services, stadium management; and transportation organisations.

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1This audit did not explicitly pay attention to the economic aspects of Euro 2000. Bureau Meerwaarde conducts this research.

2Supervision of supporters and visitors.
During the analysis of the process, attention is given to the underlying themes and processes for each of the organisations. The process categorisation of safety and crisis management served as a starting point.

4. Preparation
   A. Prevention
   B. Planning
   C. Analysis of risks and weak points
   D. Scenarios
   E. Capacity and professionalism
   F. Practice and testing

5. Organisation
   A. Allocation of responsibilities
   B. Co-ordination and co-operation
   C. Organisational structure for crisis and calamities

6. Information
   A. Organisation of the information position
   B. Content of the information position
   C. Communication: exchanging information

7. Media and communications
   A. Organisation and co-ordination
   B. Information and communications strategy

8. After-phase
   A. Reception
   B. After-care
   C. Liability
   D. Evaluation

In the audit framework, the themes, norms and aspects of the organisation of Euro 2000 are explicitly defined for the content audit and process audit. Those aspects of the content and process audit specified above are the themes. Based on established norms, evaluative statements can be made on various themes. The norms are based on general theoretical starting points of safety and crisis management in large-scale events. Furthermore,

3 Scenarios, unlike risk and vulnerability analyses, do not only determine the possible events, but also determine the measures which need to be taken in the case of such an event.

4 It is the capacity and professionalism of the staff/co-workers of the Euro 2000 which is analysed here.
a specification of the norms was made on the basis of the points of departure notified to the Lower House by the ministers in various papers, and on the current guidelines and rules drawn up for Euro 2000.

A range of aspects is indicated per theme. These are the elements of the theme to which specific attention is given in the audit. By way of illustration, we offer the elaboration of several themes taken from the audit framework. Each theme from the audit framework has been elaborated along these lines.

**Theme 1G: Ticket Sales and the Black Market**

**Norm 1G:** Measures are taken to prevent supporters with black market tickets entering the venue. Those involved are aware of these measures. Ticket policy is communicated to the supporters. The tickets are controlled. There is a selective and focused tackling of individuals in possession of illegal tickets.

**Aspects 1G:**
- ticket policy;
- communications;
- control of illegal tickets;
- alternatives.

**Theme 4C: Analyses of Risks and Weak Points**

**Norm 4C:** There is an inventory of the possible risks before, during and after Euro 2000 matches. Based on these risks, preventive and repressive measures have been developed. In addition to risk analysis, a list of possible weak points in the organisation has been made. The parts of the organisation and officials involved are aware of this.

**Aspects 4C:**
- methods of risk assessment and risk determination;
- specification of risks;
- specification of weak points;
- findings and follow-up of risks and weak points.

**Theme 5A: Allocation of Responsibilities in Euro 2000**

**Norm 5A:** The allocation of powers and responsibilities is known to all involved. All parties concerned, both at strategic and operational level, are clear on how the relations between strategic and operational decision-making regarding Euro 2000 have been formed.

**Aspects 5A:**
- specification of responsibilities;
- distribute responsibilities between organisations and within organisations;
- form and content of types of consultation;
The audit concentrates on the organisation of Euro 2000. The emphasis is on preparations taken by the government. The organisation and preparations of private organisations involved in Euro 2000 (Stichting Euro 2000, transport companies, accommodation and tourism) are dealt with in this regard but do not receive attention in the audit as a separate theme. Evidently, the audit gives explicit attention to the relations of the Dutch government with Stichting Euro 2000 and with Belgium.

**Summary of the Results**

In this paragraph, we report on the summarised findings of the first audit. The reader ought to be aware that the situation reviewed was the status on 1 February 2000. Since then, the parties involved will probably have implemented new measures while those pledged in the first audit may have been realised. This will be dealt with in more detail in the second audit and in the evaluation of Euro 2000.

**Contents**

1. Festivity and Safety

The governments and private organisations concerned are continuously weighing up the festivity and safety aspects. At the end of the day, this amounts to measures and communications directed at the smooth running of an extremely large international event with a number of exceptional characteristics. In preparing the event, attention has been given to the various conditions that such a celebration could be subject to, and the conditions involved in a safe event.

2. Possible Expansion of Legislative Tools

To date, a great deal of attention has been given to the legislative tools of all involved. There are high hopes of a number of legal powers yet to be introduced. However, the extent to which the police and other organisations and authorities involved will actually be able to use these powers before and during Euro 2000 is unclear. Because of the short time span, there is pressure on the exercise of and operationally sound entering into force, of these powers. For this reason, many are mainly placing their trust in emergency powers. They assume that emergency powers are the ultimate tool in realising all the administrative acts that could be required.
3. Differences between Belgium and the Netherlands
There are differences between Belgium and the Netherlands with respect to the statutory powers of both the police and the football organisation, drug and alcohol policy, transport facilities (whether or not travel is free), the police structure set up for Euro 2000 and the way in which preparations are made. Authorities and organisations striving to reach uniformity in both countries consider these differences a problem. For authorities and organisations using differentiated policy and measures between the countries and the cities as a policy starting point, the differences comprise far less of a problem.

4. Policy Directives and Bounds of Tolerance
Policy directives and bounds of tolerance are given in general in the Government Framework and the Tolerance Profile. At present, these general starting points are specified in the host cities. It is not clear right now which actions will and will not be tolerated. The organisations involved are seeking a balanced relationship between hospitality and safety given that the Tolerance Profile has taken hospitality as its leading principle so far. Thanks to the operational reinforcement of the Tolerance Profile, safety considerations will be given more attention.

5. Perimeters
Supervision of the various elements of Euro 2000 has been structured in a number of ways. In the months to come, the plans will be translated into operational measures. Here, special attention will be given to the organisation and responsibility relating to the outer perimeters surrounding the stadiums. The scope of the responsibility of the government and Stichting Euro 2000 with regard to this perimeter is a point of discussion. Questions are raised concerning the desirability, feasibility and efficacy of the outer perimeter.

6. Enforcing Match Attendance Bans and Illegal Tickets
Ideas differ on the actual possibilities of enforcing match attendance bans and illegal tickets.

7. Foreigners Policy
The foreigners policy in the context of Euro 2000 is currently under preparation. The authorities and organisations involved are still not clear about the conditions and grounds on which aliens (including citizens of the European Union) can be deported as a result of specific (anticipated) public order problems. The circular devoted to this aspect will appear in the near future.
8. Alcohol Policy
At a national level, efforts are being made to realise an unequivocal alcohol policy. The host cities are striving for differentiation. None of the organisations involved promotes a complete ban on the sale of alcohol in parts of the city. Measures should be taken depending on the anticipated risk and the usual situation in the town. This will lead to different policies in the various cities. In following a differentiated approach, the emphasis lies on good co-ordination and mutual communication.

9. Drugs Policy
The content of the drugs policy will not alter because of Euro 2000. The tolerant Dutch drug policy will be continued. This means a difference in policy between the Netherlands and Belgium. The general expectation is that continuation of the drugs policy will pose no problems to maintaining public order. However, it is stressed that the use of hard drugs will need to be more intensively monitored; the combination of alcohol and hard drugs can result in hazardous situations.

10. Ticket Sales and the Black Market
Debate on the topic of ticket sales and the black market concentrates on the penalisation of the traffic in illegal tickets. Broadly speaking, the government opposes such form of 'symbolic legislation', while Stichting Euro 2000 firmly supports it. That a ban on the illegal sale of tickets cannot be enforced is wielded as the key argument in dismissing the penalisation of black market tickets. In contrast, the penalisation of illegal ticket sales is appropriate to a consistent system of controlled ticket sales covering the entire chain — all the more because penalisation — in Belgium, too — is regulated on the basis of the Football Act.

11. Supporter Supervision
A comprehensive, tiered network of supporter supervision has been developed: stewards, international stewards, fan co-ordinators, (international) police supervisors, 'pilots' to lead fans down the designated routes, supporter co-ordinators, spotters, football fan embassies. The co-ordination of the various types of supporter supervision should be given considerable attention over the next few months. The possibility that the supporter supervision could be too tiered and too separate is questionable from a realistic perspective.

12. Organisation of Transport
Various questions arise on how transportation should be organised, mainly concerning the unknown number of supporters expected at various times
and their transportation needs. There is no overview available at present. Because of the individual nature of transportation facilities, providing such an overview is no simple matter.

13. Organisation of Accommodation
A comparable picture can be painted of the accommodation situation. Much of the available accommodation capacity of the host towns is already fully booked at the present time. There is no encompassing overview of the various accommodation options; steps are being taken to organise emergency shelters.

14. Holland Promotion
Holland Promotion is receiving little systematic attention. In the host cities, a great deal is being invested in urban promotion. The Ministry of Economic Affairs does not assign high priority to preparing for the organisation of Euro 2000.

15. Events
When it comes to events, the authorities and commercial providers deploy different starting points in the separate host towns and host regions and in other regions and municipalities. Amsterdam focuses on smaller events; Rotterdam, Eindhoven and Arnhem are consciously working towards crowd control events. There is no uniform policy on the extent and nature of events and festivities; there are divergent opinions on the desirability and possibilities of events that could contribute to crowd control.

16. Relation between Euro 2000 and Usual Events
During Euro 2000, relatively few other events will take place in the Netherlands. The first weekend of Euro 2000 coincides with Whitsun, which normally means an influx of several hundreds of thousands of tourists. The relation of Euro 2000 to usual events in the Netherlands — including everyday life — is still receiving little attention.

17. Safety, Terrorism Prevention, Disaster Prevention
As far as safety is concerned, the emphasis is on enforcing public order and safety. Terrorism prevention follows the existing structures. Over the next few months, threat analyses will be carried out, centring on Euro 2000. To date, little thought has been given to disaster prevention. This is linked to the prominent role of and considerable manpower to be deployed by the police and a lower position for the fire services and municipal medical and health service. Defining the responsibilities and powers when
tackling safety issues bordering on public order and disaster prevention is a difficult task.

18. Focus on Towns Not Playing Host to the Championship
Attention is mainly directed at safety in the host cities and to transporting fans to and from the venues. Accommodating supporters and their behaviour while journeying to other locations receives less attention. There is still relatively little insight into supporters’ travel and accommodation plans. Plans regarding these topics have yet to be completed.

Process

19. Current Status of the Preparations
In general, the current status of the preparations at present is such that a festive and safe event seems reasonable. In broad terms, the preparations are on a high level – this applies to both measures pertaining to content and to the structured supervision. The time has now come for almost all aspects to be further elaborated and put into operation, and for plans to be made operational. This not only includes developing scenarios but organising transportation and accommodation and the administrative decision-making structure in crisis situations.

20. An Overview of the Preparations
The preparations for Euro 2000 are intensive and comprehensive. Many parties concerned are intensively committed to the preparations; the majority is of course unavoidably involved in only a small part of the whole. Gaining a full picture of all the preparations is almost impossible. For this reason alone, total management and control of Euro 2000 from a central point is not feasible. Hence, the emphasis is placed on co-ordination between national level (the ministries involved) and local levels (the host towns together with other municipalities and regions).

21. External Involvement in the Preparations
Key to the preparations is the content: the organisation of the world’s third largest international sports event. This takes into account the exceptional nature of a football tournament with such enormous imaginative appeal. The ‘political sector’ – and the Lower House in particular – has shown striking interest to date. The media have also been greatly preoccupied with the organisation of Euro 2000 at various points. The responsibility, expertise and competence of the operational organisations involved in the organisation of Euro 2000 deserve every respect.
22. **Extensive Consultative Structure**
Euro 2000 is the third largest sports event in the world. An enormous number of organisations and officials are involved; an extremely large consultative structure functions on the various levels which results in considerable administrative business.

23. **Overview and Adjustments**
A small number of individuals in critical places have a reasonable overview of what is going on in the Netherlands, Belgium and abroad. For some time, events, activities and explanations have gained attention every day. This requires those concerned to adjust the organisation continually, the most recent example of which is the Euro 2000 Centre.

24. **Risk Management Rather than Risk Avoidance**
The organisations involved are regularly confronted with high hopes of the status of the preparations at that point; third parties’ unrealistic expectations that the risks of the event can be reduced to zero, cause problems to the organisations. Many of the organising parties consider a risk-free Euro 2000 utopian. Problems will crop up. The government must be capable of dealing with such problems, thanks to the preparations. This boils down to giving a realistic picture of the possible risks. For such a large-scale event, this entails risk management rather than risk avoidance.

25. **Anticipation and Resilience**
During the preparations, there has been a balance of interests between the anticipation of expected problems and the resilience that the organisations and officials will need to deal with any problems cropping up during the event. The preparations mainly focus on optimising the anticipation: meticulous planning and attention for almost every conceivable aspect. Where this is asking too much, the resilience of operational services and functionaries in particular acquire greater significance.

26. **Risk Analyses**
At the present time, risk analyses are available at general level. These general risk analyses will gain further operational elaboration in the coming months. The first steps in this direction have been taken within the National Police Project. In the weeks ahead, this will involve the actual gathering and analysis of information on specific supporters and groups of supporters. Until now, attention has been mainly focused on the organisation of risk analyses and less on their specific content.
27. Training and Practice
Training and practice comprise a crucial part of preparing for Euro 2000. In reality, training and practice have a lower priority. It costs all involved enormous effort to meet the practice norm. The parties concerned have specific and different training needs.

28. Decision-making in Crisis Situations
The administrative context of Euro 2000 is complex. The formal lines are clear; the practical elaboration has not been finalised for some points. There is no clarity concerning crisis-related events. This applies to the bi-national relations and to the relations between the structure on the basis of the National Crisis Decision-Making Handbook and the project structure of Euro 2000. Within the Administrative Management Group, in the cabinet and between both governments, no agreements have yet been made on how decisions should be taken in crisis situations.

29. Uniformity and Differentiation
The circumstances of the individual host cities with regard to Euro 2000 differ: the degree to which the town has (obvious) appeal to visitors, the extent and nature of the desired promotional activities, positioning in the tournament schedule. This is paired with the various orientations on Euro 2000, which does not always tally with the striving for uniformity of the organisation and preparations at national level. Combining the perspectives at national and local levels amounts to finding a workable balance between uniformity and differentiation of measures and organisation and between national co-ordination and local execution.

30. Cities Not Hosting the Championship
There is still little attention paid to the possible direct and indirect effects of Euro 2000 in regions and municipalities where the tournament is not played. The focus primarily targets the host cities. The other municipalities in the Netherlands can, however, be confronted with Euro 2000 in a number of ways (through accommodating fans, acting as transit areas, and disturbances involving the Dutch national team).

31. Governmental and Private Organisations
There are considerable contacts between the governments and private organisations involved in Euro 2000. The contacts are directed at such aspects as distributing responsibilities regarding the outermost perimeter, at transportation, at the provision of information to supporters and to protecting the country teams. Both sides perceive these contacts as positive
32. Safety and Commerce
The governments and private organisations are making efforts to reconcile safety and commerce. Stichting Euro 2000 is devoting enormous attention to the issue. In the daily activities involved in the preparations, the interests of safety and commerce are constantly being weighed against each other.

33. Contacts with Participating Countries
The contact with other participating countries differs. In connection with the expected influx of a number of supporters and safety risks, there are considerable contacts with Great Britain and Germany and fewer with most of the other countries, while contacts with Yugoslavia and Turkey are minimal. The visit of the Dutch and Belgian ministers to the participating countries can contribute to international co-ordination and preparation over the months ahead.

34. Increasing Awareness
Since the autumn of 1999 and in particular after the draw of December 1999, more attention has been paid to Euro 2000. The parties involved, who have been engaged in the preparations for some time already, are even facing too much of this at present. All involved are extremely aware of the high priority that organising the preparations has for their own organisation.

35. Putting Preparations into Operation
There is a discrepancy between parties who have been involved in Euro 2000 preparations for several years and those who have to shape the organisation of Euro 2000 in a relatively short time. An EC Centre has since been set up at the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations; in the host cities, many working groups are beginning to translate their products and plans into operational form.

36. 'Peaking' Too Soon or Too Late
Early preparations always contain the risk of becoming too officious and of stagnating the Euro 2000 organisation. If measures are too long coming, they run the risk of being difficult to put into practice during Euro 2000. An optimal time plan goes hand in hand with a degree of flexibility in the complex organisation of Euro 2000.
37. Information Position
Up to now, a great deal of focus has been placed on the organisation of the government’s information position. The organisation of the information position seems adequate. There is far less clarity on the content of the information available. At the present time, there is still little concrete operational information about supporters and groups of supporters. This is partly due to the fact that there is no complete certainty concerning who will attend which match and when. For the coming months, the emphasis will shift to the content of the information position.

38. National Police Project
The national police project has succeeded in boosting the Euro 2000 project when it comes to public order and safety. The Bi-national Police Information Centre is still not yet entirely operational. The next phase concerns the gathering and analysing factual information so as to make specific recommendations and reach operational measures.

39. Media and Information
The organisation and strategy of media management and public information activities concerning Euro 2000 have now kicked off. Plans have recently detailed the way in which the public will be approached over the months to come. At national level, these plans have still to be fleshed out in concrete terms. This will receive attention in the short term, when experiences with managing ‘public confidence’ during the preparations for the dawn of the new millennium can play a significant part. In addition to positive messages, a sound public information campaign will also give as realistic a picture as possible of the risks that could arise during such an event.

40. After-phase
There is currently little attention being paid to the various aspects of the after-phase of such an event. The reception and after-care of possible victims only receive marginal attention. An inventory of the various forms of liability is not available. The preparations for evaluations are shaped on a random basis.

CONCLUSION
The audit framework offers both the researchers and the organisations involved a workable checklist for analysing and implementing the preparations for Euro 2000. In practice, it gives the researchers and the
officials the idea that they have considered all the conceivable aspects of organising large-scale events. Given that the audit framework is based on academic literature and practical guidelines relating to crisis management and the organisation of large-scale events, the event should be festive and safe—providing all elements and aspects have been well organised.

However, crisis management literature primarily shows that in preparing, not only is attention required for anticipating problems, but enormous time and energy must be invested in realising sufficient resilience of the organisations and officials involved during such an event. Only the event itself can demonstrate the extent to which the anticipation was constructive and whether the resilience will be adequate over the weeks to come.

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*Crisis Research Center (COT)/ University of Leiden*

*Lange Voorhout 26*

*2514 EE The Hague*

*The Netherlands*

*E-mail: cot@cot.nl*
ABSTRACT. In this article a sociological diagnosis of football hooliganism as a world phenomenon is given. The author uses mainly English (newspaper) data about football violence (in and outside Britain) as an empirical base to explore how hooliganism can be theorised and understood. These data can usefully serve as a rough indication of the worldwide incidence of football hooliganism in the twentieth century. The author favours the figurational/process-sociological approach to football hooliganism which is historical and developmental. It also involves an exploration of the meanings of hooligan behaviour via an analysis of verbatim statements by the hooligans themselves, locates the football hooligans in the overall social structure, especially the class system, and examines the dynamics of the relationship between them and groups in the wider society. It is important, nevertheless, to stress that it is unlikely that the phenomenon of football hooliganism will be found always and everywhere to stem from identical social roots. As a basis for further, cross-national research, it is reasonable to hypothesise that the problem is fuelled and contoured by, among other things, what one might call the major ‘fault-lines’ of particular countries. Effective policies are urgently needed if the great social invention of football is to be protected from the serious threat posed by a combination of hooligan fans, complacent politicians and money-grabbing owners, managers and players.

KEY WORDS: comparative research, hooliganism, prevention policies, sports riots, sports violence

Writing in 1966, the only year in which the English inventors of the game staged and won the Finals of the football World Cup, journalist Lawrence Kitchin pithily described the soccer form of football\(^1\) as “the only global idiom apart from science”\(^2\). Since neither soccer nor science have spread throughout the entire world and the degree of their diffusion was even less at the time when he was writing, it would, of course, have been better had Kitchin referred to them as ‘emergent’ global idioms rather than as idioms which are global tout court. Moreover, although it was not so well-known or well-publicised at that time, Kitchin might have added that forms of

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\(^1\)‘Soccer’, the term by which Association football is known especially in the United States, Canada and Australia, is used to distinguish it from their own forms of the game. It is an abbreviation of the word ‘association’.

'hooliganism',\(^3\) that is, crowd and fan\(^4\) disorderliness, have historically been a near-universal addendum to this emergent 'global idiom' and that, at particular times and places (e.g. England in the 1980s), they have constituted a threat to the popularity of the game and perhaps even to its continuing viability as a top-level spectator sport.\(^5\) In this article, I shall endeavour to construct a sociological diagnosis of football hooliganism as a world phenomenon, exploring how far it can be theorised and understood using data generated in England as an empirical base. My first task must be to attend to the question of definition.

Probably the most important thing to stress in this connection is that the label 'football hooliganism' is not so much a social scientific or social psychological concept as a construct of politicians and the media. As such, it lacks precision and is used to cover a variety of forms of behaviour which take place in more or less directly football-related contexts. These forms of behaviour also vary in terms of the kinds and levels of violence that tend to be involved. More particularly, the politicians and media personnel who employ the term are liable to use 'football hooliganism' in a 'cover-all' sense which includes inter alia: forms of verbal as well as physical violence; the throwing of missiles at players, match and club officials and other fans; the vandalising of club and private property; fist fights, fights involving kicking, and fights involving weapons such as knives and even guns. It is also important to realise that such behaviour takes place, not only at or in the immediate vicinity of football grounds, but also involves fights between groups of males who share a claimed allegiance to opposing football clubs and which take place on days other than as well as on match days and in contexts, e.g. pubs, clubs, railway and bus stations, which are sometimes far removed from football stadia per se. In terms of these political and media usages, the label 'football hooliganism' is also sometimes loosely used to cover politically orientated behaviour, e.g. that of groups on the political right. It is also used in relation to protests against the owners and managers of clubs and in the condemnation of racist behaviour in football-related contexts as well as of more or less directly football-related fighting. As

\(^3\)The term 'hooligan' apparently entered common English usage in the late nineteenth century as a term for describing 'gangs of rowdy youths'. It is possibly a corruption of 'Houlihan', the name of an Irish family who lived in London at that time and who were renowned for their love of fighting (Pearson 1983, p. 40).

\(^4\) 'Fan' is an abbreviation of the term 'fanatic'.

\(^5\)When discussing how politically to tackle the problem of football hooliganism in the wake of the Heizel tragedy, Prime Minister Thatcher apparently asked leading figures in the Football Association whether spectators were an essential ingredient at matches.
one can see, 'football hooliganism' is a complex and many-sided phenomenon. Let me examine some data, generated via an analysis of English newspaper coverage, which shed light on football hooliganism as a world phenomenon.

In the early stages of the research into football hooliganism that my colleague Patrick Murphy and I started at the University of Leicester in the late 1970s,6 as a sideline to the main study which was systematically historical as well as contemporary in its focus, we examined a range of English newspapers and recorded references to football-related violence involving fans rather than players which was reported as having occurred outside Great Britain. We looked at newspapers from 1890 onwards, ceased recording at the end of 1983 and did not use newspapers as a data source again until 1996. This means that, whilst our figures cover most of the twentieth century, they do not cover the 13 years between 1983 and 1996. In that sense, they are incomplete. Nevertheless, until more systematic and intensive research along similar lines has been carried out, they can usefully serve as a rough indication of the worldwide incidence of football hooliganism in the twentieth century. More particularly, in the course of this part of our research we came across reports of 101 incidents of football-related violence involving spectators or fans which were said to have occurred in 37 countries between 1908 and 1983. The countries referred to and the number of incidents are cited in Table I.

As you can see, 16 of the reported countries — 17 if one includes the former USSR — were European. This was the highest geographical concentration of reported incidents. Central and South America, with hooliganism reported as having occurred in five countries, came second. Among the European countries, Germany, with 17 incidents reported between 1931 and 1982, Italy with 13 incidents reported as having occurred between 1920 and 1982, and Ireland with 12 reported incidents between 1913 and 1982, ‘topped the poll’! Interestingly, if the data reported in a 20-page dossier recently published by the Council of the European Union are adequate as a measure of the nation-by-nation incidence of football hooliganism — and the behaviour of a group of German hooligans in Lens, France, in 1998 suggests that they may be — Germany continues by a long chalk to lead what the authors of the dossier call “the division of dishonour”.7 This ostensible fact contrasts markedly with the dominant stereotype which continues to mark out football hooliganism as a mainly ‘English disease’.

6Together with our former Research Assistant, John Williams, we wrote three books on the subject: Hooligans Abroad (1984, 1989); The Roots of Football Hooliganism (1988); and Football on Trial (1990). Our latest position prior to the present article is summarised in Sport Matters (1999).

TABLE I

Worldwide incidence of football-related violence as reported in English newspapers, 1908–1983.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year(s)</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>(ca) 1965</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bermuda</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>New</td>
<td>1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1927</td>
<td>Zealand</td>
<td>1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1964, 1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1908</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1931, 1982</td>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>1955 (2 incidents), 1982 (2 incidents)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Apart from the reported incident in 1931, these incidents were reported as having taken place in the former Federal Republic (West Germany).

bIncludes incidents reported as having taken place in both Eire and Ulster as well as incidents reported before the partition.

Just one more comment on the figures in Table I is in order. This is that the overwhelming majority of the incidents referred to in the Table were reported in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. More particularly, 17 were reported in the 1960s, 20 in the 1970s, and no fewer than 40 in the first three years of the 1980s. This pattern arguably reflects both a factual increase in the incidence of football hooliganism during that 30-year period and a correlative increase of press interest in football hooliganism as a ‘newsworthy’ subject. The latter increase also occurred correlatively with growing popular and political interest in football hooliganism as a social problem and with what one might jargonistically call the ‘tabloidisation’ of the popular press, that is, the rise to prominence, largely as a result of intensifying competition with television news, of popular newspapers in the sensationalising tabloid form, a process which had as one of its repercussions a parallel, though lesser,
trend towards the sensationalising of reporting in the more 'serious' or 'broadsheet' press.

Probably more than any other single incident, it was the Heizel tragedy which took place in Brussels at the 1985 European Cup Final between Liverpool and Juventus that fixed the idea of football hooliganism as an 'English disease' firmly in the minds of people around the world. What happened on that occasion was that a charge of Liverpool hooligans across an inadequately segregated and under-policed terrace led the targeted Italian fans (who were not 'ultras', the Italian equivalents of English football hooligans, although 'ultras' were there in force in other parts of the ground) to flee,⁸ the build-up of pressure leading a defective wall to collapse and 39 Italians to lose their lives. If asked, it seems likely that a majority of people, perhaps especially in Western countries, would identify Heizel as the worst directly hooligan-related football tragedy to have occurred in modern times. The data in Table II, however, suggest that this is not the case and that football and football hooliganism outside Europe have involved a greater number of fatalities and perhaps also a greater incidence of murderous violence than is the case with their counterparts in Europe, the continent where people consider themselves to stand at the apex of 'civilisation' and where, if Norbert Elias (1939, 1994a) is right, a 'civilising process' can be demonstrated factually to have occurred since the Middle Ages.

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**TABLE II**

Selected matches at which serious crowd violence was reported.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Match</th>
<th>Number of deaths</th>
<th>Number of injuries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>River Plate versus Boca Junior</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>San Luis versus Fortaleza</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Deportivo Cai versus Club Argentina</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Peru versus Argentina</td>
<td>287–328</td>
<td>5000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Kayseri versus Sivas</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Moscow Sparta versus Haarlem</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Williams et al. (1984, 1989).*

⁸Skirmishes between Liverpool and Juventus fans took place in several parts of Brussels, especially in and near the city centre, in the hours before the match. Whilst the Juventus 'ultras', the closest to Italian equivalents of the English football hooligans, were mainly housed at the match on segregated terracing, the Liverpool hooligans shared a terrace with non-hooligan Italians, many of whom had been sold tickets on the day of the match in violation of UEFA's regulations. It was the latter fans who were attacked in a terrace charge and it was from their ranks that the 39 victims came.
Sketchy though they are, the figures on football-related murders in Table III point in the same direction. Italy, the European country with the highest incidence of football-related murders reported in the years 1996–1999, had five, whereas Argentina, largely as a result of the activities of the notorious barras bravas, had a reported incidence of 39, almost eight times as many.

The Heizel tragedy occurred at or near the crest of a rising wave of English-inspired hooligan incidents in continental countries, the first of which occurred in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Williams et al. 1984, 1989). One of the correlates of this wave was the imitation of English hooligan styles by continental fans but I propose to ignore that in this context. More to the point for present purposes is the fact that Heizel and the overall reaction to it also represented a peak in the politicisation of the English hooligan problem. It did so in the sense of leading for the first time to direct Prime Ministerial involvement in the problem and contributing to the introduction in Parliament of the Football Spectators Bill, Part I of which demanded computerised entry to matches. It also led the Union Européenne de Football Association (UEFA) to ban English clubs — though not the national side—from European competition sine die and to an annual attempt by the English Football Association (FA) to secure their readmission. Between them, the passage of the Football Spectators Bill through Parliament and the annual attempt of the FA to secure the readmission of the English clubs helped to sustain media and popular interest in the hooligan problem at a high level.

In its turn, the intense media searchlight led to large numbers of incidents being regularly observed and reported, amplifying the problem in each of two senses: firstly perceptually, by making it appear that more (and more

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of murders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>48</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Continental fans in the 1970s and 1980s also began to imitate English/British fan behaviour more generally, e.g. their songs and chants. The adoption by English fans of the ‘casual’ style was, of course, an example of diffusion in the opposite direction — from Italy to England and Scotland.
serious) incidents were occurring than was objectively the case; and secondly factually, by providing the oxygen of anonymous publicity which so many hooligans crave, in that way helping to sustain and even to increase the frequency of their hooligan involvements. The Hillsborough tragedy of 1989 in which 96 people lost their lives at an (abandoned) FA Cup Semi-Final match between Liverpool and Nottingham Forest constituted another watershed in this connection. The tragedy was indirectly related to hooliganism in two senses: firstly, as part of the official attempt to contain and control the hooligan threat, terrace fans in England—those who (used to!) stand rather than sit to watch matches—were forced to watch from inside what were, in effect, wire cages; and secondly, the police interpreted an attempt by Liverpool fans to escape from a lethally overcrowded terrace at the Leppings Lane end of Sheffield’s Hillsborough Stadium as a hooligan pitch invasion, leading them to keep the fans caged in and the 96 people to be crushed to death.

The central relevance of Hillsborough for present purposes, however, lies in the fact that, in his official enquiry into the tragedy, Lord Justice Taylor concluded that computerised entry was more likely to increase than to decrease the incidence of crowd fatalities. As a result, the Government was forced to climb down and, in 1990, Part I of the Football Spectators Bill was withdrawn. This contributed in its turn to consequences such as the following: the depoliticisation of the hooligan problem; the correlative withdrawal by UEFA of its ban on English clubs; a decline in the ‘newsworthiness’ of the hooligan problem; a decrease in the frequency with which it was reported; and a growing impression that, in England, football hooliganism was becoming ‘unfashionable’, a ‘thing of the past’.

This impression was given graphic expression by sociologist Ian Taylor when he wrote in 1991 that: “An astonishing sea-change is taking place in the culture of some of (England’s) football terraces.” He attributed this supposed process to a conjuncture of what he called “the BBC’s packaging” of ‘Italia 90’ with the removal of perimeter fences from grounds in response to the report of Lord Justice Taylor. According to Ian Taylor, the dynamics of this process worked according to something like the following pattern: the removal of ‘cages’ reduced the frequency of ‘animal-like’ behaviour among the fans, and this interacted with the TV packaging of the 1990 World Cup Finals in which, as Ian Taylor put it, “the opera of Pavarotti; would meld ethereally into a poetic display of European football”, producing

10Standing terraces were made illegal at grounds staging top-level English matches as a result of the implementation of Lord Justice Taylor’s recommendations in his enquiry into the Hillsborough tragedy of 1989.

Despite the elegance of Ian Taylor’s language, the problem with this kind of impressionistic, non-research-based analysis is that it involves a gross oversimplification regarding the hooligan problem and is in many respects simply empirically false. What happened in England during the 1990s was that, in conjunction largely with its depoliticisation, the *reporting* of football hooliganism became unfashionable, not so much the phenomenon itself. This was the case especially as far as the reporting practices of the national media were concerned and regarding ‘bread and butter’ domestic matches. On account, among other things, of their higher profile, it was less the case regarding internationals. For example, the 1990 World Cup Finals were accompanied in England by a hitherto virtually unprecedented form of hooliganism, namely outbreaks around the country of rioting, fighting and attacks on foreigners and foreign cars by fans who had been watching England’s Italia ’90 matches on TV. Similar outbreaks occurred during Euro ’96 and the 1998 World Cup Finals. Events during Euro ’96 are particularly instructive in this regard.

It is widely believed that Euro ’96 passed off without the occurrence of hooliganism on a substantial scale. For example, discussing the hopes of the English FA that FIFA might allow England to host the 2006 World Cup, journalist Martin Thorpe wrote of Euro ’96 that: “UEFA’s ability to turn a handsome profit on a tournament in which England matched the best teams on the field and avoided trouble off it will go down well with FIFA when it chooses a venue for the second World Cup of the new century” (*The Guardian*, 12 October 1996). The England team’s standard of play – they reached the semi-finals only to be beaten by Germany in a penalty shoot-out – the standard of football produced in the tournament overall, and the carnival atmosphere generated by the majority of people in the crowds cannot be disputed. What is in doubt is whether trouble was avoided off the field. There is ample evidence that it was widespread. For example, crowds gathered in London’s Trafalgar Square following England’s game against Spain on 22 June and had to be dispersed by riot police. Disturbances were also reported in Hull, and fights between Englishmen and Spaniards were reported as having broken out in Fuengirola and Torremolinos on Spain’s Costa del Sol (*The Independent*, 24 June 1996). By far the most serious rioting occurred, however, following England’s defeat by Germany in the semi-finals when trouble was reported, not only in London, but in Basingstoke, Bedford, Birmingham, Bournemouth, Bradford, Brighton (where a Russian teenager was mistaken for a German, stabbed in the neck
The agonising moment when Gareth Southgate's penalty was saved [...] was the trigger for a night of sustained hooliganism. Draped in flags and brandishing bottles, thousands spilled out of the pubs and bars [...] within moments of Germany's victory [...] The worst flashpoint came in Trafalgar Square [...] (It was the centre of [...] orchestrated rampage [...] Up to 2,000 people poured into the square shortly after 10.06 pm [...] (T)he situation rapidly deteriorated [...] Cars and motorists [...] found themselves engulfed in the rapidly-escalating violence with German Volkswagens and Mercedes singled out. A hard core of 400 hooligans [...] burst out of the square and attacked a police patrol car. The two officers inside had to flee for their lives as in less than a minute the car was smashed to pieces. The hooligans surged towards the Thames, shattering windscreens, turning one vehicle over and setting fire to a Japanese sports car [...] Between 10.10 pm and midnight, police received over 2,500 calls requesting urgent help. Of these 730 were related to violent disturbances [...] The final toll around Trafalgar Square was 40 vehicles damaged, six overturned and two set alight. Seven buildings were damaged with 25 police officers and 23 members of the public injured across London, as well as a further 18 casualties, both police and civilians, in Trafalgar Square itself [...] Nearly 200 people were arrested across London with 40 held during ugly scenes in Trafalgar Square. (Daily Mail, 28 June 1996)

These events were the most violent among a series, varying in violence and scale, which took place across England during Euro '96. They took place despite a co-ordinated police effort which had been planned for some three years, cost an estimated £20 million (BBC 1, 10 July 1996), and involved the well publicised arrest of 'known hooligans' up and down the country before the tournament. Times sports correspondent John Goodbody realistically concluded that: "What Wednesday night emphasised is that whenever the English supporters are taking part in an international tournament, it is inevitable that there will be trouble. However careful the preparations, troublemakers will ensure that there will be confrontations" (The Times, 28 June 1996).

Events in France in July 1998, especially in Marseilles, proved John Goodbody right. Earlier, England fans had rioted in Sweden in 1992, in Amsterdam and Rotterdam in 1993, and in Dublin in 1995. In Dublin, they forced the abandonment of an Ireland – England match. Proponents of the 'hooliganism is a thing of the past' thesis (e.g. Helgadottir, The European, 23 September 1991; Taylor, Independent on Sunday, 21 April 1991) can only account for such incidents by claiming with tortuous logic that the English hooligans have become peaceful at home and only engage in
violence abroad. Alternatively, they suggest that the fans of Premiership teams have become peaceable as a result of an interaction between more
effective police and club controls and fashion changes among fans in the
direction of both more carnival-like and consumer-orientated behaviour
(Giulianotti 1999). Hooliganism, they suggest, remains more stubbornly
entrenched at the lower levels of the game. However, the evidence is against
them, suggesting the use of a kind of Ptolemaic logic on their part. Take
the figures in Tables IV, V and VI. Table IV offers a selection of incidents
known to the police which took place at or in conjunction with Premiership,
Football League and other top-level (e.g. pre-season ‘friendly’) matches
during 1992-1993. Table V summarises data furnished by the British
Transport Police (BTP) for the period 21 August 1990 to 22 December
1993, a period during which they recorded 655 incidents of varying levels
of seriousness which had taken place at or in the vicinity of railway stations
or on trains.

Table VI is based on 69 reports of football hooliganism which appeared
in 13 English newspapers between June 1996 and October 1999. A total
of 110 incidents were referred to and/or described in these reports. Sixty-
nine of them were reported as having occurred in England or Wales, and a
further 20 as having involved English fans abroad. In 12 of the latter cases,
the English fans were reported as aggressors and in the remaining eight as
victims. Of the 21 incidents that remain, five were reported as involving
Dutch fans, four Argentinian fans, four Italian fans, two German fans, two
Russian fans, one an Iranian fan and the final one a Scottish fan. Twenty-
four of the incidents were reported in 1996, 19 in 1997, 59 in 1998 and eight
in the months January to October 1999. The larger numbers reported in
1996 and 1998, the years of Euro ’96 and the last World Cup respectively,
are clearly a reflection of the heightened interest in hooliganism that is
generated in conjunction with major tournaments.

Who are the football hooligans and why do they behave as they do? An
examination of some popular and academic explanations will start to shed
light on these issues. In England, five main popular explanations of football
hooliganism have been proposed, each of them espoused by the media,
politicians and members of the general public. These explanations — some
of them at least partly contradictory of the others — are that football
hooliganism is ‘caused’ by: excessive alcohol consumption; violent incidents

11The implication here is that their arguments are reminiscent of the convolutions of
Ptolemy of Alexandria and subsequent pre-Copernican astronomers as they struggled to
fit empirical observations into their ‘geocentric’ or earth-centred view of the solar sys-
tem.
on the field of play or biased and incompetent refereeing; unemployment; affluence; and 'permissiveness'. None of them is supported by the available evidence, at least as far as playing a deeper, more enduring role in the generation of football hooliganism is concerned. Alcohol consumption cannot be said to be a 'cause' of football hooliganism because not every fan who drinks in a football context fights, not even those who drink heavily. The converse is also true—that not all hooligans drink before fighting because they need a clear head in order to direct operations and avoid being caught unawares by rivals or the police (Dunning et al. 1988). There is an indirect connection between hooliganism and alcohol consumption, however, in that the masculinity norms of the groups involved tend to stress ability to fight, 'hardness' and ability to 'hold one's ale' as marks of being a 'man', and tests of masculinity are one of the things that football hooliganism is all about.

Violence on the field of play and refereeing that is or is perceived as biased, can similarly be dismissed as lying at the roots of football hooliganism. That is because incidents take place before and after as well as during matches, often at considerable distances from grounds. Nor can unemployment—the favoured 'cause' of the political left—be said in some simple sense to produce football hooliganism. For example, during the 1930s when unemployment in England was high, the incidence of reported match-related violence was at an all-time low. Similarly, when English football hooliganism began to enter its current phase in the 1960s, the national rate of unemployment was at its lowest ever recorded level. And today, the rate of participation in football hooliganism by the unemployed varies regionally, being higher in areas such as the North of England where unemployment is high and lower in usually low unemployment areas such as London and the South-East. In fact, almost every major English club has its hooligans, independently of the local rate of unemployment, and fans from more affluent areas used in the 1980s regularly to taunt their less fortunate rivals by waving bundles of £5 or £10 notes at them en masse, singing (to the tune of 'You'll never walk alone') 'You'll never work again'! However, unemployment can be said to be an indirect cause of hooliganism in the sense of being one among a complex of factors which help to perpetuate the norms of aggressive masculinity which appear to be involved.

The fourth popular explanation of hooliganism, namely that 'affluence' rather than unemployment is the principal 'cause', tends to be favoured by the political right. Not only is it in direct contradiction of the explanation by reference to the supposed 'causal' role of unemployment, it is also sometimes associated with the explanation in terms of 'permissiveness', e.g. when it is suggested that football hooliganism is an attribute of the 'too much, too soon' generation. However, whatever form it takes, the
TABLE IV

Selected hooligan incidents at or in conjunction with Premiership, Football League, international, pre-season friendly and other matches in England and Wales.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Match/fans involved</th>
<th>Type of incident</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7.10.92</td>
<td>Notts. Forest versus Stockport</td>
<td>CS gas used, 8 policemen hurt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.10.92</td>
<td>Sunderland versus Newcastle</td>
<td>30 arrests, 200 ejected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.10.92</td>
<td>Leyton Orient versus Swansea</td>
<td>Fights in London (Marble Arch)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.10.92</td>
<td>Grimsby versus Portsmouth</td>
<td>Missiles thrown at players</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.11.92</td>
<td>Darlington versus Hull</td>
<td>Pub fights in city centre and station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.11.92</td>
<td>Stoke versus Port Vale</td>
<td>Fights inside/outside ground/town centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.11.92</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.12.92</td>
<td>Chelsea versus Manchester Utd.</td>
<td>CS gas thrown in Covent Garden pub</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.1.93</td>
<td>Southend versus Millwall</td>
<td>Pitch invasion, pub fights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.1.93</td>
<td>Tranmere</td>
<td>Fan beaten to death (racial more than football-related)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.1.93</td>
<td>Cardiff versus Swansea</td>
<td>Pitch invasion, pub fights*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.1.93</td>
<td>Leicester versus West Ham</td>
<td>Fights outside ground, CS gas thrown in pub</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.2.93</td>
<td>Tottenham versus Leeds</td>
<td>300 in fight, CS gas thrown in pub*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3.93</td>
<td>Tottenham and Blackpool fans</td>
<td>Fighting in Blackpool prior to Spurs/Man. City match</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3.93</td>
<td>Man. City versus Tottenham</td>
<td>Pitch invasion, fighting outside ground*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.3.93</td>
<td>England U18 versus Ghana</td>
<td>Attack on police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.3.93</td>
<td>Sheffield Wed. versus Sheffield Utd.</td>
<td>Fighting, murder*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.3.93</td>
<td>Peterborough versus Leicester</td>
<td>Pitch invasion, arson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4.93</td>
<td>Millwall versus Portsmouth</td>
<td>Pub fights, missiles thrown*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.4.93</td>
<td>England versus Holland</td>
<td>Pub fights, police attached</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5.93</td>
<td>Reading versus Swansea</td>
<td>Fighting inside/outside ground, pitch invasion*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5.93</td>
<td>Aston Villa versus Oldham</td>
<td>Disturbances in Oldham; riot police used</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5.93</td>
<td>Exeter versus Port Vale</td>
<td>Attack by fans on referee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.5.93</td>
<td>Millwall versus Bristol Rovers</td>
<td>Pitch invasion, missiles thrown*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.5.93</td>
<td>Halifax versus Hereford</td>
<td>Mounted police used. Fighting inside ground</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Div 1 Play-off</td>
<td>Portsmouth versus Leicester</td>
<td>Fights outside the ground</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Semi-Final</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Div 1 Play-off</td>
<td>Swindon versus Leicester City</td>
<td>Leicester fans ransacked Wembley pub. Disturbances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final</td>
<td>(at Wembley)</td>
<td>in Swindon</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Denotes police judgement of disturbances sufficiently serious to ‘stretch’ available police resources. These data were provided by Ian Stanier, a Leicester post-graduate student.

explanation in terms of ‘affluence’ is contradicted by the available evidence and seems largely to result from a mis-reading of the fashion-switch on the part of young British football fans during the 1980s from the ‘skinhead’ to the ‘casual’ style. The skinhead style was, of course, openly working class; the casual style, by contrast, is apparently ‘classless’. The clothes worn by devotees of the latter style, however, may be but are not necessarily expensive. Sometimes they are stolen and sometimes only apparently expensive, e.g. when ‘designer labels’ are sewn onto cheap, sometimes stolen sweaters. Of course, some hooligans are at least temporarily affluent, either because they have well-paid jobs, prosperous parents or because they make money through black market activities or involvement in crime. But the bulk of the available evidence runs counter to the ‘affluence thesis’.
A SOCIOLOGICAL UNDERSTANDING OF HOOLIGANISM

TABLE V


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Season</th>
<th>Number of incidents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990–1991 (21.8.90–5.6.91 includes end-of-season play-offs)</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991–1992 (17.8.91–3.6.92 includes end-of-season play-offs and one international)</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993–1994 (24.7.93–22.12.93 first half season only)</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>655</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The remaining 12 incidents known to the BTP took place in conjunction with pre-season matches.

to become available in the 1960s and they have been, on the whole, remarkably consistent since that time, suggesting that, while hooligans come from all levels in the class hierarchy, the majority come from the ranks of the working class and have low levels of formal education (Dunning et al. 1988), I shall return to this issue later.

The popular explanation in terms of ‘permissiveness’ appears to be similarly deficient. It is superficially plausible in that the advent of the so-called ‘permissive society’ in Britain in the 1960s coincided with the growing perception of the behaviour of football fans as problematic by the authorities and the media. However, football hooliganism in Britain as a fact if not by name can be traced back to the 1870s and 1880s (Dunning et al. 1988) and the coup de grace for the ‘permissive society’ argument is given by the fact that, since football hooliganism began to be recognised in Britain as a social problem in the 1960s, football matches have become more heavily policed and subject to tighter controls — watching British football has become anything other than ‘permissive’. Moreover, during the 1980s, members of the Thatcher government sought explicitly by means of ‘authoritarian’, ‘law and order’ policies to reverse what they saw as the

TABLE VI

Number of hooligan incidents reported in selected English newspapers, June 1996 — October 1999.*

| Incidents reported as occurring in England and Wales | 69 |
| Incidents reported as involving English fans abroad as: |   |
| Attackers | 12 |
| Attacked | 8 |
| Incidents reported as involving fans from Argentina (4); France (2); Germany (2); Iran (1); Italy (4); the Netherlands (5); Russia (2); Scotland (1) | 21 |
| **Total** | **110** |

*Twenty-three of these reports appeared in The Guardian, 18 in the The Leicester Mercury and 15 in The Observer.
generally deleterious 'permissiveness' of the 1960s and 1970s. Nevertheless, football hooliganism, along with crime in general, continued to grow. Let me turn now to the principal academic explanations of football hooliganism that have so far been proposed.

Besides the 'figurational' or 'process-sociological' approach on which the present article is based, five main academic approaches to the study of football hooliganism can be distinguished: the 'anthropological' approach of Armstrong and Harris (1991) and Armstrong (1998); what is perhaps best called the 'quasi-ethnographic, postmodernist' approach of Giulianotti (1999); the Marxist approaches of Taylor (1971, 1982) and Clarke (1978); and the approach in terms of 'psychological reversal theory' advocated by Kerr (1994). Each of these explanations has its particular strengths. However, each has its particular weaknesses, too.

The anthropological work on football hooliganism by Armstrong and Harris is based on rich, in-depth description of the behaviour of hooligan fans from Sheffield, a two-club town. It is theoretically eclectic, present-centred and, as is often the case with ethnographic or participant observation research, its principal author (Armstrong) seems insufficiently aware of the limitations which derive from reliance on the unsupported testimony of a single individual. This is true of the work of Giulianotti, too. Insufficient attention is also paid by Armstrong to the ways in which the dynamics of fan behaviour and relationships may have been affected by the fact that Sheffield is a two-club town; and the need for comparative observation with one-club towns such as Leicester and other two-club towns such as Liverpool and Nottingham was apparently not seen. Nor, and this again holds good for the work of Giulianotti, is sufficient attention paid to change over time. These limitations are compounded by the author's peremptory dismissal of virtually all research in the field other than his own, a stance which is not conducive to open dialogue and hence to the possibility of publicly establishing the degree to which the, in many ways rich, deep and dense, Sheffield findings confirm or refute the findings of others.

The work of Taylor and Clarke is set more directly within the sociological canon of replicable, testable work than that of Armstrong and Giulianotti. It is also insightful regarding the ways in which developments in English football have been bound up with the capitalist character of the economy. However, neither of these authors carried out systematic in-depth research into hooliganism and both apparently fail to grasp the significance of the fact that football hooliganism principally involves conflict between working

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12'Figurational' or 'process sociology' is the synthesising approach to the subject pioneered by Norbert Elias. See e.g. his *What is Sociology* (1978).
class groups which only regularly become involved in conflict with the football authorities and the police—and less directly with other representatives of the state—as part of an attempt to fight among themselves. In his early work, Taylor even romantically described football hooliganism as a “working class resistance movement”. Marsh et al. do not make such mistakes. However, their work lacks an historical dimension with the consequence that they tend to see hooligan fighting—or what they call ‘aggro’—as an unchanging historical constant. Moreover, in their stress on ‘aggro’ as ‘ritual violence’—as violence which is mainly symbolic or metonymic in the sense of involving aggressive posturing but not the completion or ‘consummation’ of aggressive acts, they fail to see that ritualised aggression can be seriously violent.

Finally, through his use of ‘reversal’ theory, Kerr seems to do little more than dress up in complex psychological jargon some relatively simple sociological ideas. For example, he writes:

The metamotivational state combination operative during most types of soccer hooliganism activity is paratelic-negativistic-autic-mastery. The paratelic-negativism element within this combination (with accompanying high levels of felt arousal and felt negativism) gives rise to the type of provocative, playful paratelic aggression that characterises so many examples of soccer hooligan activity. Hooligan behaviour in these circumstances is not necessarily malicious, but is engaged in with the major purpose of generating excitement and the pleasures of release from rules. (Kerr 1994, p. 109)

Kerr seems to think that the football hooligans’ quest for excitement through violent, deviant and delinquent acts in football-related contexts can be explained as a simple ‘reversal’ from one “metamotivational state”, “boredom” (Kerr 1994, pp. 33ff.), to another, ‘excitement’. It is difficult to see how what he writes does more than dress up in psychological language what Elias and I had written more than 20 years before (although we wrote about routinisation in this connection and not simple boredom) (Elias and Dunning 1986) at the same time reducing a complex and graduated socio-behavioural reality to a crude dichotomy. Above all, there is no reference in what he writes to what is also arguably at stake in football hooligan fighting, namely norms of masculinity. These figure centrally in the figurational/process sociological explanation.

The figurational/process-sociological approach to football hooliganism is historical and developmental. It also involves an exploration of the meanings of hooligan behaviour via an analysis of verbatim statements by the hooligans themselves, locates the football hooligans in the overall social structure, especially the class system, and examines the dynamics of the relationship between them and groups in the wider society. Shortage of
space means that I can only briefly examine some of our data on the meanings and social locations of English football hooligans in the present context. Here are some verbatim quotations which shed light on the characteristic values and motives of English football hooligans. As one can see, they have remained relatively stable over time. Reminiscing about the emotions experienced during his days of active hooligan involvement in the 1960s, E. Taylor wrote in *The Guardian* in 1984 of:

> The excitement of battle, the danger, the heightened activity of body and mind as the adrenaline raced, the fear and the triumph of overcoming it. To this day, when trouble starts at a game I come alive and close to getting involved. I may not forget the dangers of physical injury and criminal proceedings but I do ignore them." (*The Guardian*, 28 March 1984).

Similar sentiments were expressed by a 26-year-old lorry driver interviewed in conjunction with the 1974 Cardiff City versus Manchester United game, a match where serious trouble had rightly been anticipated by the authorities and the media. He said:

> I go to a match for one reason only: the aggro. It’s an obsession. I get so much pleasure when I’m having aggro that I nearly wet my pants [...] I go all over the country looking for it. [...] (E)very night during the week we go round looking respectable [...] (T)hen if we see someone who looks like the enemy, we ask him the time; if he answers in a foreign accent, we do him over, and if he’s [...] got any money on him, we’ll roll him as well. (Harrison 1974, pp. 602–604)

Here is how one of our Leicester informants put it in 1981. His words illustrate the sort of rationality which tends to be involved:

> If you can baffle the coppers, you'll win. You’ve just gotta think how they’re gonna think. And you know, half the time you know what they’re gonna do ‘cos they’re gonna take the same route every week, week in, week out. If you can figure out a way to beat ‘em, you’re fuckin’ laughin’: you’ll have a good fuckin’ raut. (‘Raut’ is Leicester slang for a fight).

Finally, when interviewed in 1984–1985 for the Thames TV documentary, *Hooligan*, a member of West Ham United’s ‘Inter City Firm’, England’s most notorious football hooligan gang at the time, said:

> We don’t – we don’t well, we do go with the intention of fighting, you know what I mean [...] We look forward to it [...] It’s great. You know, if you’ve got, say, 500 kids coming for you, like, and you know they’re going to be waiting for you, it’s—it’s good to know, like. Like being a tennis player, you know. You get all geeed up to play, like. We get geeed up to fight [...] I think I fight, like, so I can make a name for meself and that, you know. Hope people, like, respect me for what I did like.
Despite the fact that they cover a period of more than 30 years, these statements are consistent. What they reveal is that, for the (mainly) young men involved, football hooligan fighting is basically about masculinity, territorial struggle and excitement. For them, fighting is a central source of meaning, status or 'reputation' and pleasurable emotional arousal. Thus, Taylor spoke of 'battle excitement' and 'the adrenaline racing'; the ICF member referred not only to the excitement generated in fighting but also to the respect among his peers that he hoped his involvement would bring; and the lorry driver spoke of 'aggro' as a pleasurable, almost erotically arousing obsession. This latter point received substantiation when Jay Allan, a leading member of the Aberdeen Casuals', a Scottish football hooligan 'firm', wrote of fighting at football as being even more pleasurable than sex (Allan 1989). Another non-English expression of this kind of sentiment was provided in 1994 by a 17-year-old Brazilian torcida who told a reporter for the Rio paper, Journal do Brazil: "For me fighting is fun. I feel a great emotion when the other guy screams in pain. I don't care about how other people feel as long as I'm happy" (The Australian, 15 December 1994). This is similar to the delight taken in injuring and inflicting pain on others reported of some leading members of the Chelsea 'Headhunters', a neo-Nazi hooligan crew exposed by Donal Macintyre in a documentary on BBC 1 on 10 November 1999.

What about the social class antecedents and locations of the football hooligans? Social class raises complex and contentious sociological issues of definition and measurement. However, although the available data on the social origins and current stratificational rankings of English football hooligans remain relatively scanty and cannot be described as definitive or 'hard' such as they are, they suggest that while football hooligans come from all levels of the class hierarchy, the majority, some 70-80%, are working class in terms of their social origins and most usually in terms of their present stratificational standings as well. That is, the majority of their parents had low levels of formal education and worked or work in manual occupations, whilst the majority of the hooligans themselves have failed to rise above their parents' social level. The data also suggest, with one main possible exception, that this sort of distribution has remained relatively stable since the 1960s when English football hooliganism first began to attract public concern. More particularly, the data of Harrington (1968) on the 1960s, Trivizas (1980) on the 1970s, and the Leicester group (1985, 1988) as well as Armstrong (1998) on the 1980s, and the Leicester group, again, on the 1990s, all suggest that the majority of English football hooligans (and some of their German counterparts as well) come from the lower reaches of the social scale. However, a small proportion is recruited from around
the middle and an even smaller one are from at or near the top. Let me explore this pattern and the data which support it in greater detail.

Harrington's 1968 analysis of the occupations of 497 convicted hooligans showed a preponderance of labourers and unskilled workers (see Table VII). Over a decade later, Trivizas (1980) reached a similar conclusion. More particularly, on the basis of data about 520 offences committed at 'football crowd events' in London's Metropolitan Police Area during the years 1974–76, he found that:

More than two-thirds (68.1%) of those charged with football-related offences were manual workers [...] Only 8 football-related offences were committed by people in 'intermediate' occupations. 6 were committed by students, 3 by individuals in professional occupations, and 3 by members of the armed forces. (Trivizas 1980, pp. 281–283)

Harrison's impressionistic account of Cardiff City's 'committed rowdies' in 1974 paints a similar picture. He depicted them as coming from "Canton and Grangetown, rows of terraced houses with few open spaces, and from Llanrumney, a massive council estate with an appalling record of vandalism" (Harrison 1974, p. 602). Although Marsh et al. did not directly address the issue of social class in their 1978 study of Oxford United fans, some of their informants did provide relevant comments. For example, one of them said: "If you live up on the Leys (an Oxford council estate) then you have to fight or else people piss you about and think you’re a bit soft or something" (Marsh et al. 1978, p. 69). In fact, over half the large contingent of Oxford fans arrested during serious disturbances at the Coventry City – Oxford United FA Cup match in January 1981 came from the estate in question (Oxford Mail, 9 January 1981). Evidence from Leicester supports this general picture. One council estate alone contributed 87, or 20.32%, of the 428 local persons arrested in a football context in the years 1976–80. In 1981 and 1982, the years in which the participant observation part of the Leicester research was carried out on this estate, the occupations of 23 active football hooligans from the estate were as follows: two drivers, one barman, one slaughterhouse man, three bouncers, one bookmaker's assistant, three factory workers (two in the hosiery trade and one in boots and shoes), one milkman, one apprentice printer, one apprentice electrician, one builder's labourer, and eight unemployed.

The possible change in this overall pattern that I referred to earlier is pointed to by the data in Table VII, more particularly by the fact that Harrington's 1968 data suggest that 12.9% of his arrested football hooligans were skilled workers, compared with 24.1% in the Dunning et al. figures
for West Ham United's 'Inter City Firm' (ICF) in 1985, and 46.8% in Armstrong's 1987 data on Sheffield United's 'Blades'. In a word, these data suggest that an increase in the participation in football hooliganism of skilled relative to unskilled and semi-skilled males may have occurred in the 1980s as compared with the 1960s and 1970s.

Assuming that it did, in fact, occur, this putative increase in the participation of young skilled workers in football hooliganism seems to have corresponded with the abandonment by football hooligans and young football fans more generally of the 'skinhead' style which was avowedly working class and their adoption of the apparently middle class or classless style of the so-called football 'casuals'. Although the figures it contains are very scanty and perhaps more than usually unreliable, the data culled from English newspapers and reported in Table VIII appear to provide confirmation of the continuation of this pattern into the late 1990s. It should be noted, however, that the occupations of two Germans are included in this table and that the description of himself as a 'property tycoon' by one English hooligan may have been a 'wind-up'.

Research on the social class of football hooligans in Scotland, Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy suggests that hooligans in other countries tend to come from social backgrounds similar to those of their English counterparts. A study of Scottish 'football casuals', for example, found that:

All the evidence points to the fact that 'football casuals' come predominantly from the lower levels of the social scale and are basically working class youths. (In the Edinburgh survey, 75% of the 'casuals' arrested fell into the 'unskilled manual' or 'unemployed' category. None came within the 'managerial-professional' category). (Harper 1989, p. 90)

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.5 b</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skill non-manual</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled manual</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figures exclude those for schoolboys, apprentices, the unemployed and those with occupations unclassifiable in terms of the Registrar General's scheme.

bProfessional and intermediate classified together.
TABLE VIII

Occupational data from selected British newspapers on arrested English and German hooligans, 1997–1998.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Upper and middle class</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Property tycoon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intermediate and indeterminate</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IT worker (City of London); clerical worker; engineer; bank worker; self-employed glazier; tattoo shop manager (German)</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Working class</th>
<th>15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hospital worker; factory worker; parcelforce worker; post-office worker; postman; railway workers (2); floor layer; roofer; RAF fireman; tiler; soldier; mould operator; builder; apprentice mechanic (German)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total                           | 22 |


Similarly, a study of hooliganism in Belgium concluded that “most of (Belgium’s) ‘hard core’ football hooligans [...] had a short and frustrating school career. Most [...] come from unstable working class families. Almost none [...] have a regular job [...] Their material situation is poor, the casuals get their expensive clothes by theft.” (Van Limbergen et al. 1987, p. 8) According to the research of Van der Brug in Holland, typical Dutch hooligans tend to resent and resist formal education; are more likely than non-hooligans to be unemployed; have parents who display a relatively tolerant attitude towards the use of violence and aggression; and gain prestige and status from fighting and generally displaying macho characteristics (Van der Brug 1986). Finally, on the basis of a survey of Bologna ‘ultras’, Roversi concluded that:

The majority of young ‘ultras’ are from the working class. The group in employment contains 169 males and 46 females. In this group the skilled and unskilled blue-collar workers visibly predominate, both compared to workers of other kinds and within the sample as a whole; they represent 80.3% and 51.9% respectively. They are warehousemen, porters, shop-assistants, bricklayers, carpenters but above all shop-floor workers [...]. It must be emphasised that only 3.9% of the entire sample admitted to being unemployed. (Roversi 1994, pp. 359–381)

Despite differences of theoretical, conceptual and ‘methodological’ orientation, there is substantial consistency between these Scottish, Belgian, Dutch and Italian findings and those of Harrington, Armstrong and Trivizas with those of the Leicester research. It is important, nevertheless, to stress
that it is unlikely that the phenomenon of football hooliganism will be found always and everywhere to stem from identical social roots. As a basis for further, cross-national research, it is reasonable to hypothesise that the problem is fuelled and contoured by, among other things, what one might call the major 'fault-lines' of particular countries. In England, that means social class and regional inequalities; in Scotland and Northern Ireland, religious sectarianism; in Spain, the linguistic sub-nationalisms of the Catalans, Castilians, Gallegos and Basques; in Italy, city particularism and perhaps the division between North and South as expressed in the formation of 'the Northern League'; and in Germany, the relations between East and West and political groups of the left and right. One of the differences that these variable patterns may make is, for example, that sectarianism and city particularism as bases for football hooliganism may draw in more people from higher up the social scale. Arguably, though, a shared characteristic of all these 'fault-lines' is that they involve variants of what Elias (1965, 1994b) called 'established-outsider figurations' in which intense 'we-group' bonds and correspondingly intense antagonisms towards 'they-groups' or 'outsiders' are liable to develop. However, let me make myself perfectly clear. I do not consider this as having the status of anything more than a working hypothesis. It needs to be subjected to public discussion and tested by means of systematic, theory-guided, cross-national empirical research. Doubtless in that context, it will need to be revised, expanded, modified and perhaps even rejected altogether. It is my hope, though, that this article will serve as a basis from which a programme of cross-national research on football hooliganism can be constructed which will enable more effective policies for tackling the problem at both the European and national levels to be developed and put into place than those which powerful groups have offered so far. Such policies are urgently needed if the great social invention of football is to be protected from the serious threat posed by a combination of hooligan fans, complacent politicians and money-grabbing owners, managers and players.

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Emeritus Professor of Sociology, also visiting Professor of Sociology,
University College Dublin
University of Leicester
Centre for Research into Sport and Society
14 Salisbury Road
Leicester LE1 7RQ
UK
E-mail: ED15@le.ac.uk
SPECTATOR VIOLENCE IN SPORTS: A NORTH AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE

ABSTRACT: Spectator violence has long been associated with professional football in Europe. This article examines the issue of spectator violence from a North American perspective. We begin by noting that there is little systematic research into the scope of spectator disorder in North America. Perhaps for this reason there is little consensus about the true scale of the problem on this side of the Atlantic. It does seem clear at least that there is less spectator violence associated with professional sports in North America. After reviewing a number of explanations for this finding, we conclude that it has less to do with criminal justice policies or practices, than the social context surrounding the 'spectatorship' of sports in North America. Perhaps the most important explanation for the variance in crowd behaviour concerns the demographic profiles of sports spectators in European football and North American sports.

KEY WORDS: comparative research, hooliganism, spectator violence, sports riots, sports violence

INTRODUCTION

The eve of the first major sporting event of the millennium is a propitious time to reflect on a problem which has plagued professional football in Europe for the past few decades: crowd disorders and spectator violence. In this article we explore this troubling issue from a North American perspective, with a view to understanding the scope of the problem on this continent, and the explanations for the relatively low levels of spectator violence compared to Europe. Particular emphasis will be placed on comparisons between professional ice hockey in North America and European football. Although the former is only one of several professional sports on the American continent, the aggressive nature of North American hockey\(^1\) offers an interesting contrast to European football.

We begin by noting differences in the reactions of sports fans in North America and Europe to on-field aggression by players. Then we discuss the limited research on spectator disorders as well as the relatively rare incidents of crowd violence in North America. This is followed by a

\(^1\)Edwards and Rackages (1977) for example, describe professional ice hockey as “a game of mayhem”.

discussion of the explanations for the lower levels of spectator aggression observed on this side of the Atlantic Ocean. This article attempts to answer the following question: are the lower rates of spectator violence in North America a consequence of specific circumstances of sports in North America, or as a result of extraordinary criminal justice measures?

This article takes as its point of departure two apparent paradoxes. First, the most visible and serious manifestations of sports-related violence are associated with football, a professional sport that takes a highly punitive approach to violence occurring on the field. At the same time, sports which either tacitly permit aggressive behaviour (American football) or adopt a rather laissez-faire approach towards the punishment of aggressive behaviour by players (the National Hockey League (NHL) in North America) elicit little (if any) imitative spectator aggression.

The resolution to the paradox is to be found in a number of complex cultural and contextual variables, which we attempt to explore in this article. Stott and Reicher (1998, p. 354) argue that spectator violence is not “a unitary phenomenon with a unitary explanation”. In a similar way, we shall conclude that there is no single explanation for the relative tranquillity surrounding crowds attending sports events in North America; it is rather a product of a number of factors related to North American society and the culture of sports ‘spectatorship’ that has emerged on this continent. However, it would appear clear that criminal justice policies are not responsible for the absence of violence among crowds attending sports events in North America; the solution lies outside formal systems of social control.

Public Interest in Sports Violence around the World

Another paradox emerges from the literature on sports violence. Although the level of spectator violence at sporting events seems higher at European football games than North American sporting events, research on attitudes generally shows greater spectator interest in sports violence in North America. For example, Zillman and Paulus (1993) summarise findings from experimental research which showed that enjoyment ratings were positively associated with the level of aggression in the game itself. Mustonen et al. (1996) compared the reasons given by Finnish and Canadian males for attending an ice hockey match. These researchers found that Canadians were more likely to cite the prospect of witnessing player fights as a reason for attendance. Hockey players also seem to be aware of the appetite for violence among their supporters (see Smith 1976a).

The most recent study conducted on this question consists of an international, representative survey of public attitudes to sports violence in
10 jurisdictions. Members of the public were asked to agree or disagree with the statement "I like violence in sports". Results indicated that respondents in the one North American country included in the survey (Canada), were three times as likely as respondents in England, France or Germany to agree with this statement (ROI Sports Research 1999). A greater appetite for violence cannot therefore explain higher levels of spectator violence in Europe.

THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM IN NORTH AMERICA

Is there a problem with spectator violence in North America? This relatively straightforward question has generated conflicting answers. Researchers seem divided, some arguing that it is a myth that spectators are very tranquil in North America. Lewis (1982, p. 176) for example argues that “fan violence in the United States is a social problem that warrants serious study” (see also Williams et al. 1984). Others argue that the severity of the problem has been significantly over-estimated. Where is the truth to be found? Over 20 years ago, Edwards and Rackages (1977, p. 17) described the literature with regard to spectator violence as “extremely sparse”. It would appear that little has changed since then. This in itself may say something about the scope of the problem, which has failed to generate much attention either from empirical researchers or official criminal justice agencies.

Criminal justice statistics that record whether a criminal act occurred in relation to a sporting event are not compiled. Any incident giving rise to the laying of a criminal charge at a sporting event would be classified within a broader category of crime statistics. It is not possible therefore, to know how many arrests have been made for spectator violence in recent years. Researchers are forced to rely on content analyses of newspapers, or anecdotal analyses, rather than upon official crime statistics. A recent research example using this approach is the contribution to this special issue of the European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research by Roversi and Balestri. These researchers provide an historical breakdown of spectator incidents related to football matches in Europe. This analysis is based on media reports of crowd disorders.

There have been few such analyses conducted in North America, and even these are somewhat out of date now. In one of the few empirical studies conducted, Smith (1976b) examined incidents of crowd violence in North America that were reported by the principal Canadian newspaper over the period 1963–1973. The study produced only 27 incidents over the 10-year period, and some of the incidents did not provoke any police
intervention, suggesting that they were not necessarily examples of criminal acts.

Lewis (1982) examined American newspaper stories drawn from a comparable 12-year period (1960–1972), and found only 15 hockey-related stories describing fan violence. Fan violence was defined in this content analysis as an incident involving five or more spectators, which may have attracted incidents which would pass unrecorded in Europe. In addition, many of the incidents classified as 'fan violence' (over two-thirds of the American football incidents) arose from amateur games rather than professional matches. There are reasons to believe, therefore, that these studies captured a level of fan violence that was not as serious as incidents occurring in the context of European football. This may undermine the utility of this research as a comparison with Europe.

Recent Spectator Disorders in Professional Hockey

It would be a mistake, however, to believe that spectator violence at sports events is an exclusively European phenomenon. In recent years, Canada has witnessed major sports-related riots in several cities. The Canadian riots differed significantly from the football-related violence in Europe in several important respects that have shed light on the nature of the phenomenon in North America. The Canadian incidents did not involve the clash of opposing fans, they were not related to frustration generated by failure on the field, and alcohol played little or no causal role in provoking the incident. In fact, with one exception, they were 'celebratory riots'.

Montreal Riots

In 1986, the Montreal Canadiens won the Stanley Cup (the annual championship involving all professional teams). A crowd moved systematically through the downtown core, looting, burning and destroying property. The subsequent judicial inquiry held that the Montreal police had been negligent in failing to anticipate the event, and in failing to control the rioters once the event was underway. Eight years later, history repeated itself, on and off the ice. The Montreal hockey team again won the Stanley Cup (in Montreal) and riots again took place in the streets. On this occasion the police deployed well over 1,000 uniformed and plain-clothes officers, including the entire riot squad, but to no avail. The damage wreaked on the downtown core included the destruction of dozens of buses and police cruisers and the arrest and injury of hundreds of people. Damage to businesses in the downtown area exceeded several million dollars.
Subsequent analyses of events in Montreal seemed to show police negligence was again a contributing factor to the extent of the damage.2

_Vancouver Riot_

The difficulty in generalising about the causes of spectator violence is apparent from events taking place in Vancouver, British Columbia a year later, when Vancouver residents took to the streets following a televised hockey game. This time it could not be classified as celebratory violence; their hockey team had been beaten by New York in the Stanley Cup final. It is also interesting to note that the Vancouver riot was a reaction to events transpiring thousands of miles away: Vancouver lost to New York in New York, so there was no apparent target for the riot, no opposing fans or players on whom to wreak 'revenge'. Finally, unlike Montreal, on this occasion, the timing of the event meant that alcohol appears to have played a precipitating role. Once again, however, inadequate policing appears to have failed to anticipate or react appropriately to events as they unfolded.3

It is worth noting that the kinds of criminal acts that were associated with these riots were quite unlike the acts typically attributed to soccer hooligans. Melnick (1986) provides an informal typology of activities associated with football supporters. The list includes physical assaults on other supporters, the throwing of missiles, itself a form of attempted assault, verbal abuse, and possession of a weapon. Most of these are forms of _directed_ or instrumental acts; the arrests made in the Canadian riots were exclusively for public order offences, drunkenness and vandalism. The conflict-filled and ritualistic elements of spectator disorders associated with football hooligans were absent in the Canadian riots.

Taken together with the systematic research based on media analyses, what do these accounts of disturbances tell us about the seriousness of the problem of fan violence in North America? The riots need to be seen against a context of spectator tranquillity. Each year, approximately 1,000 professional hockey games take place. In the 20,000 games held over the past 20 years, serious disorders have arisen on fewer than five occasions. It is also worth noting that lesser forms of crowd disorders, such as the

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2For example, there were long and inexplicable delays in deploying the riot squad in the place of regular officers.

3The 1994 Vancouver riot led to a change in police application of the law. The sale and distribution of alcohol is a matter of provincial jurisdiction. Following the 1994 riot, the Vancouver police evoked a section of the B.C. Liquor Control Act to seize bottles of wine from members of the public riding the mass transit system. The actions provoked a formal complaint against the police by the B.C. Civil Liberties Association.
chanting of racial slogans, which became a significant problem in the United Kingdom, are totally unheard of in North America.

How do these trends compare with the European experience? Belgium serves as a comparison for the Canadian data with regard to hockey-related disorders. In his contribution to this special issue, Stéfan de Vreese provides data with respect to incidents involving matches at which ‘hardcore’ elements were present. De Vreese notes that over an eight-year period, almost 5,000 incidents were recorded, for an average of over 500 incidents per season. Even though the number appears to have declined in recent years, statistics from Italy provided by Roversi and Balestri for this special issue show an average of 49 incidents at soccer matches over the period 1989–1998. Such statistics place the hockey-crowd incidents in Canada in some statistical context.

To summarise, although the research is somewhat sketchy, and there has been little systematic work over the past few years, it seems clear that the problem of fan violence is significantly less serious in North America than Europe. While disturbances have occurred, they have lacked the hooligan element found in the worst episodes of football crowd disturbances in Europe. The incidents have not achieved the lethality seen on many occasions in Europe. As a social problem, it seems safe to conclude that spectator unrest is far worse at sporting events in Europe than North America. Perhaps the most telling indicator of this is the absence of major crowd disturbances when the World Cup finals were held in America in 1994. We see little reason to disagree with the conclusion reached by Smith almost 20 years ago, when he wrote that: “sports crowd violence, in North America at least, seems relatively infrequent. This is especially true in light of the countless opportunities for such disturbances” (Smith 1983).

Finally, in terms of placing the issue in some context it is worth noting the general absence of ‘control’ research which looks at disturbances involving crowds attending non-sporting events. It would be useful to know how many incidents of ‘fan violence’ occurred at rock concerts over a comparable period of time, although no such comparable analysis has been conducted. Certainly there have been a number of media reports of violence involving such crowds.

At this point we turn to an examination of the various possible explanations for the lower levels of spectator violence in North America.

EXPLAINING THE LOWER INCIDENCE OF VIOLENCE IN NORTH AMERICA

Regulating the Accessibility of Alcohol

Clearly, no single explanation will suffice to explain the relative tranquillity surrounding crowds attending professional sports events in North America.
Indeed, what is striking about the available theories is how little they explain. Alcohol is one conventional explanation. The presence of alcohol is a well-known risk factor for violence in many social contexts, including domestic violence and spectator violence. The elevated levels of fan violence surrounding European football matches may be explained in part then, by the consumption of alcohol at European sporting events. For this reason, authorities have taken many steps to restrict the availability of alcohol, particularly in the United Kingdom. Measures taken include changing licensing hours, prohibiting the sale of alcohol during matches, changing the times of matches themselves and even prohibiting the sale of alcohol on ‘football specials’, routinely-scheduled trains that happen to be travelling at a time likely to result in a significant number of visiting supporters heading for a game.

No such measures have been taken in North America. In fact, licensing laws pertaining to sports events have actually been relaxed in recent years. Alcoholic beverages can be purchased by hockey fans prior to the start of a game, and during the game. Vendors traverse the tiers of seats carrying trays of beer, in much the same way that ice cream is sold in European cinemas. And yet levels of spectator violence are lower in North America.

Contextual, cultural factors also mediate the effects of alcohol. Although alcoholic beverages are freely and openly available at hockey matches in North America, there is no tradition for spectators to gather in bars prior to the start of the game. The drinking that occurs prior to and during major sports events in North America frequently takes place in private residences, where people assemble with their friends to watch the game. The consumption of alcohol prior to and during the game is far less public, and less likely to erupt into aggression. In short, the absence of alcohol cannot explain the lower levels of crowd disorders in North America.

Contrasting Supporter Cultures

Another possible explanation for the contrasting levels of spectator violence in North America and Europe involves the culture of the sport itself, and in particular relations between groups of supporters who may come into conflict. Many English football clubs date back to the creation of the English Football Association over a century ago, and supporters’ clubs date back equally far. This degree of history (and accompanying depth of feeling) associated with a club is unheard of in North America. Expansion of the NHL has taken place rapidly; in 1967 there were only six teams in the NHL. Within 30 years the number of franchises (that is, teams) has more than trebled. In addition, many teams have been sold from one city to another,
making fan identification with a particular city a transitory phenomenon. This is quite unlike the European experience. The idea of the team currently playing as Manchester United being ‘sold’ to another city is of course unthinkable in the United Kingdom, although it happens frequently in North America. In short, there has simply not been the time for intense rivalries (which can provoke violence) to develop in North America.

Since the NHL teams are located in cities spread out across the continent, it is very rare for fans of say, the Montreal Canadiens, to travel to Dallas or Vancouver to watch their team play an ‘away’ game. Even during the Stanley Cup finals, only a handful of fans will travel to away games, unless it involves teams that play in neighbouring cities (such as Ottawa and Montreal). However, scanning the crowd at any professional hockey game will reveal a substantial number of fans supporting the visiting team. This demonstrates that support for a particular team is not geographically determined in the way that it is in the United Kingdom. The prospect of significant numbers of residents of South London supporting Manchester when United visit to play Chelsea would be inconceivable. But when Montreal plays across the country in Vancouver, a significant percentage of the Vancouver crowd will wear Montreal colours, in the same way that the New York Yankees attract followers who live thousands of miles from Yankee stadium.

The presence of supporters of the opposing team who clearly do not live in the visiting team’s city may well have an impact on the probability of violence occurring. It may inhibit the kind of ‘Us versus Them’ logic which generates de-individuation and the objectification of dissimilar others. There is simply no tradition of aggressive interaction between opposing teams’ supporters in North America. The ritualistic verbal abuse which is exchanged when rival football supporters meet in the United Kingdom is largely absent in professional hockey events in North America. It is worth noting in this context that in the Lewis (1982) study of North American fan violence, rivalry between groups of fans was never a factor.

The fan culture in European football is to a degree at odds with an effective criminal justice response to hooliganism. In North America, considerable effort is made to integrate the crowd into crowd control. One of the specific goals of the police response has always been to encourage victims of criminal acts to report incidents and assist in their effective prosecution (see Kiersh 1981, for a discussion of the application of this principle).

It is worth noting that one of the principal causes (or justifications) of football violence involving British supporters is quite absent in North America. Taylor (1972, p. 372) for example, has characterised football
hooliganism as a "sociologically explicable, ‘democratic’ response to the loss of control exercised by a football subculture over its public representatives". Taylor argues that football supporters have seen ‘their game’ taken away from them by club owners. The sports subculture in North America has not embraced the concept of ‘shared ownership’ of clubs, which have always been seen to be the exclusive property of extremely wealthy individuals or conglomerates. The link between fans and owners in hockey has never been strong. Finally, it is worth noting the absence of strong ‘supporters’ clubs in North America. In contrast, European football clubs have well-developed supporters clubs which may serve to enhance commitment to the club which in some cases may develop into antagonism for other clubs.

Normalisation of Public Violence

The expression of violence, either before, during or after a football match, became in the 1970s in Europe, fairly common. This may have led to a ritualistic self-perpetuation of the problem. In North America, such public displays of violence reflecting supporters’ affiliation with a professional sports team have always been unheard of, with the exceptional events to which we have already alluded in this article. A norm of passivity has arisen around even the largest and most well-attended sporting event, the so-called ‘Super Bowl’. This is the final game which decides the pre-eminent team in American football (the National Football League). It takes place in a stadium holding upwards of 60,000 spectators, and yet has never generated the kind of violence which can erupt in a mere league game in Europe but which involves ‘arch rivals’. Another element facilitating the expression of spectator violence in Europe is the perceived legitimacy of crowd behaviour following a game. Pitch invasions are an invitation to violence, but they simply do not occur in ice hockey, and there is no tradition of such behaviour in North American sports played in stadiums.

The Role of the Media

In Europe, the role of the media has generally been to amplify the deviance of football supporters (see Hall 1978). Participant-observation studies have shown that the publicity accorded episodes of spectator violence has several consequences, including a certain degree of demonising football supporters. However, there is also little doubt that attracting banner headlines is a source of gratification for many hardcore football hooligans. The media appear to play a different role in North America, and for several reasons may well serve to diminish the likelihood of spectator violence.
Firstly, only a relatively small number of fans (typically 10–15,000) can attend a professional hockey game in person. Secondly, the relatively short supply of tickets means that prices are high (relative to other entertainment), and a significant proportion of seats are purchased by corporations for their clients. The result is that for the vast majority of fans, ice hockey is mediated by television coverage. ‘Hockey Night in Canada’ attracts huge audiences, and represents the principal means by which most Canadians follow the NHL. This presence of the media means that the spectator experience has a ‘cool’ quality that is not matched in European football. All ice hockey games are televised live, unlike football in the United Kingdom, where only a select few matches are televised, and these are only available to individuals with access to certain channels. This blanket coverage of the game permits all members of society to become spectators, and reduces the need to attend in person.

In contrast, supporters in Europe still regard attending a game as the most authentic way of following the sport. The English Sports Council reports that approximately a third of respondents under 30 reported having attended a football game within the past year (Sports Council 1978). No comparable statistics are available for ice hockey, but the percentage of Canadians who would have attended an ice hockey game is undoubtedly much lower.

To summarise, the experience of sports for most North Americans is heavily mediated by the media. As Duncan and Brummett (1987, p. 225), have noted the significance of the sport for the spectator is to a degree dictated by the media, transforming sports into “something other than what they would be if observed live and in person”. The ‘social episode’ of attending an ice hockey game is quite different from that of attending a football match. It is much less likely to involve direct participation or to involve contact with opposing fans.

**Demographic Variation in Spectator Profiles**

Perhaps the most persuasive explanation for the different responses of sports crowds on the two continents concerns the demographic profile of people who attend sports events. Another consequence of the high ticket prices and the significant numbers of corporate seat owners is that attending a professional ice hockey game is all but beyond the means of the unemployed or the working class. In their study of spectator violence associated with football, Murphy et al. (1990, p. 89) note that: “The data [...] all suggest that the majority of football hooligans come from the bottom of the social scale. A much smaller and relatively stable proportion
is recruited from around the middle”. Waddington (1992, p. 119) notes that “hooligan fans” are “mostly white, working-class males aged 17–20” (see also Brown and Ellis 1994). Arrest data gathered by Trivizas (1980) demonstrated that 99% of individuals arrested for football offences were male. This reflects in large measure the predominantly male nature of football crowds.

The characteristics of sports fans in North America are quite different. Guttman (1986) provides data showing that North American football crowds are likely to be middle-class, college-educated and almost half of the spectators are women. This last fact is critical as the preponderance of males has been identified as one of the risk factors for fan violence in Europe (e.g. Roadburg 1980). Ice hockey fans have a similar profile, and this sets them apart from European football crowds, even though there has been considerable change in the composition of the latter.4

The most recent data pertaining to professional ice hockey fans make the picture even clearer. A survey of supporters of the Toronto Maple Leafs hockey team (a typical NHL franchise) found that almost half (45%) were female, with an average income of almost $70,000, considerably above the national average income. Almost half the spectators were employed in professional occupations or were owners of their companies, and almost half were executives or managers. Most importantly, perhaps, the average fan was in his or her mid-thirties, well beyond the age category with the highest participation rates in crime. Recent crime statistics reveal that the under-20 age category accounts for almost half the crimes recorded by the police (Kong 1998).

The demographic profile emerging from comparable surveys of persons attending professional basketball and baseball games (Maple Leaf Sport 1999) is little different. If anything, supporters attending these other sports were wealthier and more likely to have graduate degrees than the hockey fans. Thus for all major North American sports, the crowd profile bears little resemblance to the characteristics of persons attending soccer matches in Europe.

**Absence of Links with Right Wing Groups and ‘International’ Confrontations**

Although as Waddington (1992) notes, the links between fascist organisations and football hooligans in the United Kingdom have been overstated, they

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4The proliferation of ‘family’ stands, and the general spreading of interest in football across social classes in the UK has changed the demographic profile of crowds to a considerable degree.
do exist. Similarly, violence relating to sports events on the continent is occasionally sparked or exacerbated by right wing groups, particularly at games involving national teams. Such links do not exist between right wing groups in Canada and sports events. While there are a number of right-wing, racist groups in Canada, which have attracted young persons into their ranks, these groups have never focussed on sports events as a venue for publicity. In fact, the quasi-political nature of football hooliganism observed in Italy (see the discussion in Roversi and Balestri, in this issue) is totally absent in North America.

In addition, it is worth noting that some of the worst incidents of spectator violence in European football have involved clashes between groups of national fans (particularly British and Dutch supporters). Again there are divergences between Europe and North America. American football and baseball are sports in which no national teams compete against each other. The same can be said for basketball, except for the Olympic competitions. Even in ice hockey, matches between the national Canadian and American teams are rare, and until fairly recently the US team played at a lower level of proficiency, a fact which prevented a rivalry with the Canadians from developing. Even the famous hockey confrontations between Canada and the former Soviet Union were rare events, which frequently took place in Europe with few Canadian supporters in attendance. In short, the nationalist fervour that has on several occasions precipitated crowd violence in Europe has simply not arisen in North America.

Design of Professional Sports Facilities

A central aim of the Taylor report (1990) in the United Kingdom was to change the ethos of a football match, and one of the key recommendations was the requirement of all-seat accommodation at football grounds. This recommendation was consistent with a UEFA ruling applicable to stadiums holding European matches. The Taylor recommendation reflected recognition that seated crowds can be regulated far more easily, and the mobility of seated spectators is directed in predictable channels that can then be more effectively policed.

The design of stadiums also plays a role in inhibiting crowd disturbances in North America. The presence of seated fans has been identified as an important reason to explain the absence of spectator disorders in North America (Murphy 1990). Seating replaced stands in most major British football stadiums only after the 1990 Taylor report. But in North America, 99% of spectators at an ice hockey game have
always been seated. Being sedentary encourages a perception of the event that is consistent with the role of a spectator, rather than a participant. Mobility is also of course highly restricted when spectators are seated, and this minimises the degree of direct contact between opposing groups of supporters.

Seated crowds are clearly more orderly and easier to control and contain. However, all crowds eventually become mobile when they leave the stadium. The presence of seated spectators in North America may help to explain the absence of spectator violence in the stadium, immediately before and during the game, but not after. And yet North American crowds are generally very tranquil when they disperse as well as when they assemble. Thus stadium configurations alone cannot explain inter-continental differences in crowd reactions.

Responding to Spectator Violence

As Dunning (1990) notes, the official response to football hooliganism in the United Kingdom has, until fairly recently, stressed the threat or actual infliction of punishments by the criminal justice system. The same approach would appear to characterise the State response to the ‘Ultras’ in Italy (see Roversi and Balestri in this issue). The emphasis on repression appears to reflect several influences. Firstly, a widespread (and generally naive, see Ingham 1978; Ashworth 1995) belief that harsher punishments will serve to deter actual and potential offenders. Secondly, a perception that the punishments currently imposed on offenders convicted of sports-related crimes are too lenient. Thirdly, the news media have tended to characterise, perhaps to demonise football hooligans as representing a far greater threat to public safety than is warranted by crime statistics.

Many of the remedies advanced by writers such as Williams et al. (1984) have little or no applicability in North America on account of the nature of the problem. Regulating travel arrangements for visiting supporters, or the distribution of tickets play no role on account of the differences between North America and Europe in terms of the culture of spectatorship, to which we have already alluded.

In the United Kingdom, many (but by no means all, see Ingham 1978) commentators have called for more repressive criminal justice responses to persons convicted of football-related violence. It is perhaps a reflection

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5 Some hockey arenas permit a handful of fans to stand behind the nets, but these individuals disperse to empty seats after the first period, so there is effectively no ‘standing clientele’.
on the magnitude of the problem of spectator violence in North America that neither Canada nor the US has seen the necessity to create specific sports-related offences, or to tailor current sentencing options to the sports fan who commits sports-related crimes. Both of these initiatives have been pursued in other jurisdictions. For example, legislation directed at specific sports-related acts exists in both France and England and Wales. Even the Canadian sports riots to which we referred earlier in this article failed to provoke public demands for a more punitive response. There appeared to be recognition among Canadians that such events, while reprehensible, were very unusual and were not characteristic of sports fans in that country.

The one area in which North America has adopted a more repressive approach has involved the imposition of criminal penalties upon athletes engaging in acts that would result in prosecution if they occurred outside the field of play. One reason for invocation of criminal penalties concerns the different approaches that the sports (European football; North American ice hockey) take to penalising violence: the latter sport is far more tolerant of violence by players.

**Punishing Player Violence in the Sport Itself**

The difference in the approach to punishing player violence adopted by the two sports and apparent in the official rules reflects this different approach. Consider an incident in which two ice hockey players discard their heavy, protective gloves and start a fist-fight. Dropping hockey gloves, with the intention to thereby inflict maximum damage on an adversary with a bare fist, is in itself a threat and a gesture of aggression. In professional ice hockey, punches are frequently exchanged for several minutes before the officials intercede, and penalties are subsequently imposed.

The penalties imposed, however, are derisory by the standards of European football: both players are usually required to leave the ice for five minutes, although their teams are allowed to introduce replacements. In addition, since ice hockey players are on the ice for three-minute shifts (approximately 22 minutes per game divided across seven shifts within the course of a 60-minute game), the offender would have been off the ice for the next five minutes anyway, as his line awaited its next rotation! Moreover, the banished players may return to play (and fight) again. The players themselves suffer no financial penalty. And, since the teams continue to play with the same number of players, there is no collective penalty imposed on the team.

In contrast, a football player making even a threatening gesture which involves no contact with an opponent is liable to banishment for the
remainder of the game. He will be suspended for future games and the suspension will carry a fine of many thousands of pounds. Finally, without the ability to replace the player, a red card imposes a heavy collective penalty on the player’s team-mates, which may well determine the outcome of the match.6

Criminalising Player Violence in Order to Discourage Spectator Violence

Several researchers have argued that violence on the field begets violence in the stands. But even in Europe the support for modelled aggression seems weak at best. For example research has shown that misbehaviour among spectators, including arrests, was greatest before and at the start of the game7 (Sports Council 1978, p. 21). A leading commentator in the field has noted that “many incidents on the terrace appear to occur without precipitation from structural incidents observable in the game” (Taylor 1972, p. 372).

If aggression on the field has sometimes stimulated spectator violence in Europe (e.g. Gabler et al. 1982, summarised in Pilz 1996), it seems inapplicable to the North American experience. We can say from the outset then that modelling is an inadequate explanation of the few incidents of spectator violence that have occurred. If spectators modelled their conduct on the behaviour of athletes that they pay to watch, ice hockey rinks in North America would resemble war zones, and football stadiums in Europe tea-rooms.8

In the late 1960s, there was an attempt in Canada (and subsequently the US) to lay charges against hockey players who during the course of the game assaulted other players. The aim of this initiative was to discourage modelled aggression by spectators as well as amateur players. Several test

6One reason why the NHL has been reluctant to adopt a more punitive stance towards acts which would be criminal if they occurred off the ice is that fighting remains popular with hockey fans in North America (as noted above). Ice hockey arenas typically accommodate one-third of the number of spectators that can be seated in football stadiums. With several professional sports vying for the public’s support, hockey needs an edge over its competitors. The potential for aggression provides this advantage.

7It is curious that notwithstanding this observation, one of the Sport Council’s recommendations with respect to responding to spectator violence was to call for “stricter and immediate penalties for misbehaviour by players” (Sports Council 1978, p. 52).

8It is worth noting that if modelled aggression were the explanation for spectator disorders, it would be far more likely to emerge in a hockey arena, since there is a more intense atmosphere than in a large stadium.
cases were prosecuted, primarily in the province of Ontario. The first implicated two players involved in a stick-swinging incident. They were subsequently charged with assault causing bodily harm, but were eventually acquitted on the grounds of self-defence. The few test cases that did result in criminal convictions involved the imposition of derisory (in light of the convicted players’ salaries) fines. For example, the first conviction for assault of a professional athlete resulted in a fine of $3,000, a small fraction of the player’s monthly salary.

Thereafter, prosecutions in North America ceased, reflecting, in all probability, a lack of enthusiasm for the application of the criminal law in such a context. The initiative was more a reflection the interest of a specific Attorney-General at the time, rather than any broader consensus among prosecutors or police officers. The prosecutions launched in Canada may have served some symbolic purpose, but they had little impact either on the incidence of aggression during a game or on the level of public awareness of the problem. Domestic violence assumed a much higher public and professional profile at around the same time. Most police services adopted mandatory charging practices in cases of domestic violence. As society grew more aware of the prevalence of domestic violence — and the extent to which official statistics underestimated the magnitude of the problem — interest in rare forms of public violence such as fights during hockey games declined. And players are unlikely to come forward and either report the incident or initiate a private prosecution.

Thus the level of aggression in professional ice hockey in North America remains high (relative to other sports) although this has not resulted in any escalation in the prevalence or seriousness of spectator violence.

**Conclusions**

It would seem that the criminal justice response to spectator violence can claim only a limited role in explaining why sports violence is not observed to the same degree in North America as in Europe. The explanation for the differential levels of fan-related social disorder is to be found in the phenomenology of sports attendance on the two continents, and the demographic composition of sports crowds. Spectator disorders at sports events would not appear to be a good indicator of the general level of violence in society, as the countries with the higher rates of violence clearly have lower rates of spectator disorders.

In a prescient article written in 1980, Roadburg predicted that “crowd violence will continue to be associated with the game [of football] in Britain,
but will not develop in North America” (p. 266). The prediction has proved correct with respect to soccer in North America. Is it likely to change? We think not. One reason for this concerns the status of soccer in North America. Direct comparisons (involving the same sport) between crowd disorders in Europe and North America have not been made in this article because of the vast differences between the popularity of soccer in North America. When European football first took hold in North America there was considerable optimism that the sport would flourish at the professional level. As those who have followed the game are well aware, this has not happened. Although more children in America play soccer than any other sport, this has simply not translated into an audience for professional soccer. Not even the arrival of the World Cup finals in 1994 was able to generate much enthusiasm for the sport.

If there are any lessons for Europeans from the North American experience, it would appear to involve facilitating the conditions which make the public expression of spectator violence a socially-inappropriate response to events on the field or encounters with other fans after the game. These conditions include importing the ethos of spectatorship to counter the participant perspective of European football fans. At the end of the day, North American fans are more inclined to a perspective that they are viewing an event in contrast to European football fans, some of whom clearly see themselves as an extension of the team on the field.

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**JULIAN V. ROBERTS**  
Department of Criminology  
University of Ottawa  
P.O. Box 450, Station A  
Ottawa, Ontario  
Canada, K1N 6N7  
E-mail: jroberts@uOttawa.ca

**CYNTHIA J. BENJAMIN**  
Department of Sociology  
Queen's University  
Macintosh-Corry Building – D431  
99 University Ave  
Kingston, Ontario  
Canada K7L 3N6
ITALIAN ULTRAS TODAY: CHANGE OR DECLINE?

ABSTRACT. The authors describe a particular form of football hooliganism, namely the behaviour displayed by particular groups of young fans—in Italy the so-called ultras—consisting of acts of vandalism and systematic aggression to the detriment of similar opposing groups both within and, above all, outside the stadiums. The development over the last decade is outlined and the authors try to explain the current situation and the most recent changes. They show that, in spite of the diminishing number of incidents in the last years, this violence is changing appearance: on the one hand, it turns against the police; on the other hand it declines into pure vandalism and juvenile deviance. An important moment was the crisis caused by the death of an ultras in 1995, which marked a turning point between the 'old way' of the ultras and the new developments. A brief comparison is made with the English situation, both on the appearance of hooliganism as well as on the preventive policies, the police and the legislation on acts of hooliganism and sports violence.

KEY WORDS: hardcore elements, hooliganism, prevention policies, sports riots, ultras

INTRODUCTION

In this article we shall attempt to outline certain aspects of the current situation of football hooliganism in Italy. But, before beginning, a caveat is necessary. In fact, in the international academic literature on football-related violence, the term 'football hooliganism' is not infrequently used to indicate two distinct phenomena.

The first one has to do with what we may call 'spectator disorderliness'. This term denotes acts of wild behaviour by fans the character of which is not programmed, acts which are not aimed at the fans of the away side and which can be primarily retraced to the emotional climate of excitement aroused by the match. Such disturbances usually occur within the stadium, during or after the match, and are aimed at the protagonists of the game (players, referees and linesmen, managers, trainers). They may also involve various typologies of spectators (ranging from the regulars at the stadium ends, to the supporters in the distinti area, to the enthusiasts on the stands). The most frequent behaviours of these fans comprise throwing objects onto the field (such as...)

1 In Italy the most popular parts of the stadium are the ends that abut onto the terraces. The distinti area—the name already points to a difference of status as compared to the popular stadium end—runs along the length of the pitch and is located opposite the stand.
bottles, stones, coins) at the referee, linesmen and players; assault on the referee outside the stadium; attacks on the coach of the away team.

The second phenomenon, on the contrary, concerns the set of behaviours that can be retraced to football hooliganism in the strict sense, that is, acts of vandalism and systematic aggression that, on the occasion of football matches, are performed by particular groups of young fans – in Italy, the ‘ultras’ groups – to the detriment of similar opposing groups both within and, above all, outside the stadiums.

The first form of football-related violence has, on the whole, always been an integral part of the stadium atmosphere (see Dunning et al. 1988) and represents a stable social behaviour in the sense that its phenomenology displays no major variations in time. Looking at the most recent data, taken from some daily newspapers, regarding incidents of this type occurring from February 1995 to the present,² we can note that these behaviours are now more frequent in South Italy, where football support still entails a high degree of involvement and passion. Moreover, they are an important feature even in the lower league divisions.³

The situation is quite different as regards episodes of football hooliganism. Here, in Italy, we find a phenomenon that emerged between the late 1960s and early 1970s and spread throughout the stadiums of the principal cities in the north, subsequently reaching the south and the provinces. Thence, during the 1980s, it expanded and took root also in the smaller amateur divisions.

Our article will deal with this second phenomenon, and will try to explain the situation it is currently going through and the changes it features. We shall make use of knowledge accumulated during 10 years of participant observation carried out among several groups of Italian ultras. This task has been further facilitated by the establishment, in 1995, of a concrete device for monitoring the phenomenon: the Archive-Observatory for football support in Europe that combines collection of documentary material with ethnographic research in the Italian football stadiums.⁴

We shall try to show that, in spite of the number of incidents among ultras groups diminishing over the last few years, this does not mean that the

²Data gathered from a scan of the following daily newspapers: Il Resto del Carlino, La Repubblica, L’Unità and La Gazzetta dello Sport.
³Out of 59 incidents recorded in this period, 33 involved southern Italian teams and 25 took place in minor divisions (Serie C and Amateur Championship).
⁴The Archive-Observatory is part of a project called ‘Progetto Ultras’. The latter has two essential aims: to uphold the values connected with football fan culture and to limit the intolerant behaviours present in the world of football support through a social-type work conducted together with the fans themselves.
football violence of these groups is disappearing from the Italian stadiums. Rather, referring to some recent facts, we argue that this violence is changing appearance: on the one hand, more frequently it is turned against the police; on the other, we can observe its decline in pure vandalism and juvenile deviance.

To this end, we propose a brief history of the ultras movement up to the 1990s and a comparison with the analogous English phenomenon of football hooliganism. After that, we will analyse the crisis that strikes the ultras movement during the 1990s, a crisis creditable to some factors among which are mainly the high degree of physical violence that characterises the fights among rival groups and the consequent work of contrast carried on by the police. Finally, we will take into account the actual features of the ultras movement and show how it has changed appearance, in many respects, in comparison with the 1970s and 1980s.

AN OVERVIEW

We shall begin with some statistical data. We know that the statistics on episodes of football hooliganism—in the absence of other reliable data—can only be based on newspaper reports. We know, too, that the academic literature has expressed some perplexity as to the reliability of these sources (see Murphy et al. 1990) and has claimed that the newspapers are not simply passive reflectors of events such as football hooliganism, but play both an intentional and unintentional part in their construction (see Dunning 1999). As regards Britain, Eric Dunning argues, for example, that the widespread myth of the disappearance of football hooliganism as a social problem has been strongly supported by the British mass media which “depoliticised the issue of soccer hooliganism” (Dunning 1999, p. 137).

The Italian case shows a similar problem, as can be seen from Table I. Table I shows that, after reaching a peak in the 1990–1991 season, the number of incidents between Italian ultras groups appears to diminish and to show a marked reduction in particular from the 1994–1995 season onwards. In contrast to Dunning, however, we think that the fall in 'recorded' episodes of football hooliganism does not stem from the reduced attention focused on this phenomenon by the press.

—in Italy, for some years now, the Police Study Centre in Brescia has been processing and publishing data relating to incidents, season by season. These data, however, are not reliable since they make no distinction between football hooliganism and spectator disorderliness.
TABLE I


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Season</th>
<th>Number of incidents</th>
<th>Number of matches</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980–81</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981–82</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982–83</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983–84</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984–85</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985–86</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986–87</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987–88</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988–89</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>686</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989–90</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>686</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990–91</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>686</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991–92</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>686</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992–93</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>686</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993–94</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>686</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994–95</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>686</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995–96</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>686</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996–97</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>686</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997–98</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>686</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Daily newspapers: Corriere della Sera, Resto del Carlino and Stadio/Corriere dello Sport.

It is, of course, possible that decades of sometimes obsessive attention to the phenomenon by the press, sporting or otherwise, have given way to a loss of interest, also in the face of new topics that have burst into the headlines in these last few years (e.g. the Bosman ruling, or the strong drive by football clubs towards commercialising themselves). At the same time, however, analysis of the important changes occurring within the world of the ultras in recent years suggests that although the figures inevitably denote underestimated values with respect to the number of incidents that actually happened, their drop marks a real trend.

Can we say then that episodes of football hooliganism are about to vanish from the Italian football scene, as some authors claim has already happened in Britain? This is not the argument we intend to put forward in this article. Rather, we are convinced that traditional-type episodes of football hooliganism really have diminished, but have been partly replaced by new forms of stadium conflict which have still largely to be identified and studied. Before discussing this point, however, it would be as well to recall briefly the salient and special features by which this world has been, and in great part continues to be, characterised and by which it is distinguished from the British and North European hooligan model.
The contexts in which the two phenomena are contained differ greatly. In Britain, the birthplace of football, enthusiasm for this sports spectacle has mainly involved the working class until recently. To get some idea of the meld between football and working-class culture in Britain, consider the architecture of the stadiums whose forms closely recall the typical structures of factories; or again, as Taylor reminds us, the working-class origin of many British teams. And precisely by virtue of these origins and this link, as the studies by British scholars have taught us, the model of British football hooliganism manifests itself as a sort of extension of the traditional behaviour scheme of the rough working class. The hooligan group usually stems from the lowest strata of society; it assumes what has been called the "violent masculine style" (Dunning et al. 1986, pp. 256–257); it tends to assemble mainly to give support during the match and to attack the away fans; and it reveals an absence of developed and lasting forms of co-ordination, organisation and promotion of stadium end activities.

In Italy, on the contrary, the link between football and the working class has from the outset been more tenuous, and football enthusiasm has always involved a large number of persons from all social classes. Hence, although the ultras group was originally influenced by the British hooligan model, its social composition tends to be more cross-class (it also comprises an important female component) and marries the typical youth protest with a political slant against the system, which was shared by the extremist political groups who in the Italy of the 1960s and 1970s were engaged in demonstrations and provided an excellent example of group spirit, toughness and compactness (see e.g. Balestri and Podaliri 1998). This special characteristic helped the ultras movement to borrow modes of action and forms of organisation from the political sphere, and to endow itself with stable, complex organisational structures able to mobilise towards internal activities (choruses, production of banners and flags) and external ones (production and sale of gadgets, membership cards, subscriptions, relations with the club, etcetera).

These differences have been responsible for two diverse systems of support. The British model, hinging on a set of activities that exalt the group sense but with no particular suggestion of a durable and consistent commitment outside the match itself or during the week, even less working groups or sector leaders for the various activities. And the Italian model, in

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6 For example, West Ham, founded by a group of steel workers; Sheffield United, created by desire of some artisan cutlers; Manchester United, set up by the wishes of workers engaged in building the railway network; see Taylor 1969.

7 See e.g. Dunning et al. 1986. Recent studies have, however, given different results, which suggest that the hooligans have a broader social base, see Kerr 1994; Armstrong 1998. See also Dunning in this issue.
which the ultras group is more outward-oriented and able, thanks to its organisational structures, to arrange carnival-type demonstrations of support involving the whole stadium end and requiring considerable outlay in money, labour and co-ordination. In view of the different characteristics, it is clear how violence, too, differs in importance from one model to the other: for the British hooligans it is the main device for aggregation and union; whereas for the Italian ultras, influenced by the political view of violence as a means rather than an end, it has represented one of the group options. For the ultras group also based its own sense of community on other manifestations that eventually took on a highly symbolic value (e.g. organising choruses, producing their own material, taking part as militants in weekday organisation meetings).

By virtue of its complex associative nature, the repertory of unwritten rules governing the behaviours of members of the ultras group with respect to violence was much more complex and precise than that described by Marsh and co-workers in their book on the behaviour of the British hooligans (Marsh et al. 1983). For instance, violence was not perpetrated indiscriminately but only in specific cases and against defined groups of ultras seen as enemies; it was up to the members of the directorate (those co-ordinating and managing the groups’ activities) who decided whether and how to perform violence; the youngest were allowed to take part in fights only after giving ample proof of reliability not only in the military field but also in the organisational one; it was as forbidden to involve people alien to the ultras logic, as it was to commit gratuitous vandalism.

At the same time, however, the self-reproducing mechanism of the Italian ultras groups displayed some traits in common with the British hooligan groups. For the ultras, too, saw the stadium as the final stage of a process of socialising the group life that went on elsewhere—city district, bars, groups of friends, youth centres, political groups—and culminated in the stadium, with the admission of some of them into the football stadium end groups. In other words, for many young people the path to becoming ultras, until quite recently, commenced in other social spaces than on the terraces. This mechanism is reminiscent of the way in which, according to Dunning, some British football end groups were formed.8

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8 According to Dunning, this mechanism is based on the principle of ordered segmentation, that is, on the fact that youth groups belonging to the same community, but independent of each other, have the tendency to unite according to a fixed sequence when faced with the possibility of a conflict with youth groups of other communities; see Dunning et al. 1988, pp. 201–202. Note that in Italy this mechanism does not operate in the cities where there are fan groups of two different teams (such as Roma and Lazio). In this case, the two fan groups do not become allies to face away fans.
It was in these places that youths learnt that “normative ethical grammar” (Salvini 1988, p. 141) consisting of displaying the qualities of reliability, courage, solidarity and toughness, thanks to which they came ultimately to be considered as members of the group. Frequently, therefore, this passage was preparatory to full membership of the life at the football stadium end and the ultras group. At which point the stage of adaptation and perfecting of the learnt code to the specific football stadium end began, where hierarchies and competencies were far more structured, formalised and binding. Thus, the experience gathered outside the confines of the stadium was reabsorbed by the classic ultras group in recurring thematic schemes—the all-involving choruses, the obsessive slogans, the militarisation of the group, and a reassuring Manichean vision: friends versus enemies—and which constantly replenished the imagination of the young fan with new mythical figures and new symbolic contents drawn from the specific context of the football game.

For this reason it must be acknowledged that for a long time the ultras culture of the ‘old’, historic groups was a ‘strong’ culture, since it showed itself capable of turning the stadium end into a territory where, over and above social origins, motivations and subjective stimuli, and different life styles, the same rules and norms were valid for all the young fans. And this culture imposed a sort of monopoly on the use of violence, orienting it towards external enemies alone, and within the stadium end group managed to silence the various personal opinions in the name of common group faith. Substantially, it succeeded in endowing each individual of the Italian ultras movement with all the features of a self-sufficient and totalising microcosm, capable of emotionally integrating each member into his own role, own duties and sense of belonging to a collective dimension. Thus, in the words of an ultras:

As I see it, being an ultras is a way of life: on Monday you do the post-mortem of Sunday’s match, and right through the week you do your utmost for finances, coaches, banners, smoke bombs. At nine o’clock on Sunday morning you’re at the stadium for preparations [...] That’s how strong bonds have come about [...] The ultras phenomenon is a collective one, a strong group one (Roversi 1992, p. 123).

Death of an Ultras

At the close of the 1980s, the above-described mechanism moved towards crisis, a crisis still ongoing and productive of various transformations. Let us try to analyse its reasons, firstly with an episode that, perhaps, attained and coincided with the high point of the crisis of the rules by which the
Italian ultras movement is governed: the killing of a Genoa fan, Vincenzo Spagnolo. On 29 January 1995, on the occasion of the league match between Genoa and Milan, a young Genoa fan died after being knifed by a small group of Milan supporters. The incident produced not only a wave of alarm in public opinion and a demand for tougher repressive measures, but also a symbolic response: all the football matches were suspended for one Sunday.

But why did that young fan die? The facts are briefly as follows. As in many other Italian stadiums, the Milan end group no longer had the features once typical of Italian stadium end groups, characterised by a few large ultras groups internally organised and co-ordinated with each other, and above all capable of exercising a kind of hegemony over the behaviour of the fans at the end of the stadiums. By now, the Milan end group had lost this unitary character and the large groups had partly lost their ability for hegemony. Most importantly, small formations sprang up acting autonomously according to the logic of the moment, which is often unpredictable. Among these new small, spontaneous formations was a group of youths — known as ‘Barbour’ from the jacket in fashion with many young Italians — who wanted to become members of the Brigate Rossonere 2, a new ultras formation born out of the split in one of the major Milan fan groups, the Brigate Rossonere. The members of this new group decided to put on a show in order to advertise themselves and earn respect both within and without the Milan end group. They also involved youths of the Barbour group and determined to organise a punitive raid, some of them armed with knives, against the Genoans.

The decision was clearly taken independently of the other end groups (which would have been unthinkable some years previously). Rather than using the special train for Milan fans, the group travelled by ordinary scheduled train in order to escape police control. To avoid identification, they wore no Milan badges. Arriving at the Marassi stadium in Genoa, they were spotted by a group of home fans and the fight broke out. Young Vincenzo Spagnolo faced 18-year-old Simone Barbaglia bare-fisted, in line with ultras logic, and Barbaglia reacted by stabbing him close to the heart. Spagnolo died in hospital shortly after.

The news of Spagnolo’s death was broadcast by radio five minutes before the end of the first half. At that moment, the Genoa fans, who already knew that one of their members had been wounded, responded by trying to interrupt the match. Managers and players of the two teams acceded to the request of the end groups by leaving the field empty to grief in the second half. But, with the match over, the anger of the Genoa fans still smouldered. Desperate and furious, they tried to reach the sector of the Milan fans in
order to avenge their comrade. Urban guerrilla warfare raged throughout the night, according to the ultras behaviour code, with seven persons being beaten up and large-scale damage; whereas a mere four seconds of unregulated violence sufficed to cause the irreparable damage that was the death of Vincenzo Spagnolo.

Seven days after his death, on the football-free Sunday, following an initiative by the leaders of Genoa’s two fan clubs (Genoa and Sampdoria), a national meeting of ultras was organised. They met to reflect – on their world and on the changes that had turned it upside down – in the attempt to set limits on violence and reshape the rules for a world that seemed to have lost them altogether.

But before examining the contents of the Genoa meeting, let us attempt to outline the objective reasons underlying the crisis. We have already mentioned how the tight bond involved in being an ultras no longer held at the stadium ends. The example of the Milan end group is paradigmatic of the loss of unity and compactness experienced by the original ultras world over the last few years: nowadays, it is all too easy for a few kids with no ultras history behind them to set up individual groups and act independently. Within such groups sharp friction can often be found (at any rate, such as to threaten their relative unity). Relations among the large end groups have become anything but idyllic.

Way back in the 1980s when the movement expanded in geometrical progression even in minor and provincial stadiums, it underwent important structural changes. These were partly owing to the broad generational turnover, above all of leadership (some historic leaders died of drug abuse), but also to the general reaction in the political movements (whose influence had been responsible for a further element of identification and unity in a large part of the ultras movement) and, parallel with this, to the disintegration of many places of assembly and socialisation outside the stadium (which, as we saw, marked the first step in identification for young future ultras). Thus within the ultras movement there developed a tendency to give greater importance to the local sense of belonging and to make systematic use of parochial rivalry in identifying ultras who could be considered as enemies. Parallel with this, there was an ever stronger tendency to regard violence no longer as an instrument, but as a possibility of expression in its own right. All of which explains why the group spirit, based on the cult of toughness and paramilitary organisation, together with the morbid attachment to one’s own little homeland, prepared a fertile seedbed for racist and xenophobic attitudes. Certain of these groups, who in the early 1990s were to make no secret of their right-wing opinions, began trying to evict the historic groups from the leadership of the stadium end, flaunting a dangerous attraction
with military/heroic feats, attempting to break down the stadium end consensus of the other groups also from the point of view of more expressive activities, even so far as settling accounts by physical conflict. But the dynamics involving the stadium end groups in those years and the conflicts that they engendered also have a bearing on other aspects. For example, the economic one. In order for the ultras group to cover all its manifold activities, it has always needed substantial funds which it has sought through forms of self-financing (membership cards, sale of material) but also, in some instances, through not always clear-cut relationships with the football clubs. In this way, inevitably, ultras groups also comprise people who unashamedly exploit their position to obtain free tickets from the club which they resell for personal gain; or people who, with the club’s approval, start up sales points with ultras merchandising. This situation degenerated from the late 1980s onwards and has aroused polemics, controversies and even genuine conflicts still under way, between a ‘business’ line, a straight tough line that eschews even the minimum sponsorisation, and a third one treading the classic middle path.

More generally, however, the stadium end group ultimately became the mirror of a society more and more atomised, less and less able to produce reasons and values of togetherness. If up to the 1980s the stadium figured as a point of arrival on an aggregative path beginning in the town district, the bar, the political meeting places, capable of producing real bonds and involving large numbers, what we now see is a fragmentation unable to reproduce the reasons of common identity and sociality. And the stadium, even while it remains the privileged place of socialising, cannot but suffer the repercussions of a context so described.9

So there was a waning of interest and participation in the life of the group, a falling-off of that militancy that made the ultras existence into an involving, all-embracing style of life. As a direct result of all this, the group’s directives shrank, they lost control and hegemony over the stadium end as a whole. Respect for the elders weakened, as did the need to serve ‘apprenticeship’. There was a proliferation of ‘stray dogs’, young people who did not identify themselves with any of the stadium end groups and who, often out of no experience whatever, took a leading part in gratuitous, dangerous acts of vandalism, with no consideration or even awareness of the history and rules of the ultras movement. Even the ‘twinning’ between fan groups – formerly

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9For an analysis of the social disintegration among young people, see e.g. Berzano 1998. From the enquiry carried out in Turin it emerges that the district groups and gangs that had characterised the urban area up to the 1980s have been almost totally disappearing.
symbolic of respect and friendship among different stadium ends (and their chiefs)—have tended to break up or not to be renewed. At a fragmented stadium end the attack on a twin fan group by a single opposed group or a handful of 'stray dogs' is enough to destroy the entire alliance.

To the internal problems of the ultras world were, then, added those concerning repression from outside. Some serious incidents occurring in 1989 led the Italian government to adopt extraordinary measures against violence connected with sporting occasions. This produced Law 401 which introduced a ban on entry to the stadium as a preventive measure to be taken against anyone reported for violent offences in the sports context. This law, together with the spread, during the World Cup tournament of 1990, of closed circuit TV cameras in order to film the behaviour of the ultras in the Italian stadiums and of fans travelling to the matches, began to hit some of the group organisers, thus helping to exacerbate the crisis.

From this point of view, a comparison with what has been done, and is being done in England today, may prove useful. The two laws that in Italy and England regulate the repression of violent behaviour in the stadiums are, respectively, the 401 Act of 1989 and the Criminal Justice Public Order Act. The Italian law was, in origin, less punitive than its English counterpart, but the changes that were made subsequently and the proposed reforms that are currently being discussed in the House, have notably increased the repressive character of the initial law.

In both countries, persons known to the police for aggressive/violent behaviour in connection with sporting events, are denied access to stadiums, even before being judged. In addition, both in Italy and in England, the said persons may be searched for dangerous objects merely because they are at a stadium attending a football game. Finally, in both countries, the said persons can be charged with inciting or instigating violence (above all in Italy) or for intentional harassment and screaming since signs and aggressive slogans or insults directed to a player or the referee are penally punishable.

There is however, a substantial difference between the two countries, and this difference concerns the way in which the law is applied. In England, in the case of a flagrant violation, the practice of immediate arrest is much more common and is applied in a rigid, inflexible but altogether more transparent and less ambiguous manner. In Italy instead the practice of immediate arrest in the case of a flagrant violation is more free and arbitrary and all too often is left to the interpretation and the mood of the police officials accountable for the stadium’s order.

So it is that, in Italy, the police close their eyes to the introduction of smoke and fire crackers (the traditional tools of fans ‘Italian style’) into the stadium end areas, while they seize a great deal of harmless lighters
and small coins at the entry to the stadium. Or they fail to apply the disputable FIFA norm that mandates spectators to remain seated in all the sectors of the stadium. The result is that, in the end, the police contribute to the transformation of the stadium into a militarised place, more similar to a bunker than to a place for sporting entertainment.

The railway stations, the motorway tollgates, the roads that lead to the stadium are already garrisoned a number of hours before the beginning of the game. The away fans that come to the city with special trains or buses (sometimes even with their private cars), are taken into custody and escorted directly to the stadium. Often, the away fans are escorted right from their own city of departure. This control strategy, which turns out to be quite effective in high risk games, is often applied to low risk games as well, limiting considerably the movements of those fans who, instead of being forced to enter the stadium all at once, would rather visit the city first, or stop off at a restaurant.

The police forces that are lined up in large numbers at the entrance to the stadium in order to search the fans in an attempt to prevent the introduction of weapons and offensive banners, usually do not find any weapons, and generally only manage to seize a lot of small coins and lighters which, although in high risk games can be thrown against their opponents’ sector, are normally used only to light cigarettes and buy drinks. Since — according to Italian legislation — any sporting event can be considered an emergency situation, the police are allowed to search without warrant and can seize objects without confiscation minutes. Even inside the stadium, in the key points (that is, behind the two end areas), the police presence, already prepared to intervene, is well visible. The strong presence of the police, along with the severe measures imposed, actually ends up raising the level of tension. In addition, other restrictive measures directed especially at the away fans are often imposed. These measures, however, are not standardised, but depend largely on the directives of the police officials in the field. In some cases, they create useless friction among ultras and the police for apparently trivial reasons: sometimes the police prevent the away fans from hanging their flag from the railing, or they order them to leave the stadium, for what they claim to be ‘safety reasons’, 10 or 15 minutes before the end of the game or, worse still, they force them to remain on the tiers for hours after the end of the match.

Finally, another no less important aspect is that, while in England the institutions and the police find in the Football Supporter Association and in the fan’s projects the privileged interlocutors to agree measures of social intervention aimed at the reduction of intolerant and racist behaviour, in Italy this does not happen.
The killing of Spagnolo took place in the context described above. The ultras’ meeting held the week following his death marked official and subjective awareness by the ultras movement of the deep ongoing crisis. The leaders of well nigh all the ultras groups in Italy came to Genoa, thus rendering explicit the contradictions and profound divergences by which they are characterised. They included those who enjoyed excellent relations with their clubs and were adept at exploiting the circulation of money linked with the sale of tickets, for their own personal interests. There were those who used racism and right-wing politics in the stadium to keep the group united. Others, a much smaller number, were openly left wing. Some older ultras (35 years and upward) continued to maintain control over certain groups. There were young people aged 20–24 who, without much experience, had acquired the strong power of decision making within their own group.

The meeting produced, anyway, an important result, a communiqué signed by most of those present, entitled No More Knives, No More Thugs. The document states, among other things: “Enough of these ultras who are no ultras, who seek, at the expense of the ultras world, to make the headlines, to aspire to greatness, while ignoring the evil done (as in this irreparable case). Enough of the fashion of 20 versus two, molotovs and knives.”

This communiqué was savagely criticised by the majority of public opinion, the press, and Italian politicians. Nobody caught the important element of novelty that it contained. For it manifested a worried, if belated, acknowledgement of the crisis ongoing in the ultras world, and the fear that the entire movement might crumble under attack from those whose cowardly and irresponsible behaviour—as in the case of Spagnolo’s killer and his group—negated the traditional values of the ultras world, betrayed its original spirit and thus furnished the pretext for an even tougher crackdown by magistrates and police. With a severe act of self-criticism for not having perceived in time that the escalation of the unregulated violence threatened to undermine the very foundations of the movement, the ultras decided there and then to redraw the codes and rules concerning the use of violence, and branded as a ‘thug’, that is outside the movement, not merely anyone who betrayed a comrade or his group but also anyone disregarding the rules.

Starting immediately from the Genoa meeting, certain effects could be noted. Most groups conformed to what the document laid down, some even repudiated violence as a permissible method of action. Other groups, on the contrary, in a more or less covert fashion disagreed with the ban on weapons and did not accept it. In general, however, acts of violence have diminished, even though between February 1995 and June 1997 the number of those
injured by cutting weapons remained very high (14 persons, all with thigh wounds except for a young Moroccan who was severely wounded in the back by a group of Bologna ultras on a punitive expedition). It is anyway significant that throughout the last championship, 1997–1998, there were no stabbings at all. Equally significant is the fact that many perpetrators of stabbings come not from organised groups but from the ‘stray dogs’ category.

Nonetheless, the real fall in violent incidents should not lead us to underestimate a shift of the incidents towards the minor football divisions and the high amount of violence occurring in stadiums in South Italy. Most importantly, we must not undervalue what appears as a brand new element in these last years, namely the very large number of incidents involving ultras and police. The reference is not to episodes where the police intervene in order to prevent the fight between two rival factions, but to the direct fights between ultras and the police. Between February 1995 and the present day, there have been 28 such incidents out of a total of 82 recorded for the two top divisions alone. In other words, relations between ultras and police have notably worsened over the last few years. The climate has certainly been exacerbated by the new law passed by Parliament after the killing of Spagnolo which has made the rule about bans on entry to the stadium even more restrictive. Armed with this law, the police have aimed — sometimes in a rather too explicit way — at neutralising those responsible for ultras directives (in other words, the only ones able to exercise even partial control over violence at the stadium ends), while neglecting the ‘stray dogs’ who are often far more responsible for the episodes of violence.

The very presence of the police inside and around the stadium, often bordering on real militarisation of the territory, results in producing an increase of repression, at times exaggerated and unreasonable. In addition, certain not very far-sighted behaviours on the part of the police officers have more and more frequently ended by igniting response mechanisms by the ultras groups, or have turned into large-scale, unwarranted and indiscriminate baton charges against the fans as a whole (confining ourselves to recent episodes, we may quote the harsh criticisms made by the British government of the violent and aggressive behaviour of the Italian police at the expense of British fans before, during and after the Italy-England match played in Rome in October 1997).

More generally, however, the Genoa meeting can be said to have opened a new phase. Since that moment, many ultras groups have been trying harder to present themselves once again as an agency for socialisation not having the sole aim of practising violence. Thus they have been more closely engaged in organising charity initiatives, almost as if to emphasise the movement’s more ‘solidaristic’ aspect (ranging from the nation-wide initiative in support of a help line for battered children, to the humanitarian
aid collected for the former Yugoslavia by several Italian ultras groups). But, most important of all, they have decided to go on meeting. For, in spite of the profound differences and contrasts — over and above social class membership, birth, cultural and political backgrounds — a new awareness has been taking root among the groups: namely, that differences notwithstanding, there exists for all of them an essential unity of a higher entity — that of their common ultras belonging.\textsuperscript{10} It seems almost paradoxical, but precisely at their moment of greatest internal weakness, the traditionally rival ultras groups have found themselves able to discover points of contact and common action among themselves. Hence the most important outcome of the Genoa meeting — where, for the first time, ultras from all over Italy met, became acquainted and confronted one another — has become the ever more intensive search for further moments of dialogue among the ultras, and this very demand will lead to organising other meetings.\textsuperscript{11}

The search for encounter and confrontation within the movement has thus become a way of protecting themselves from violent internal degeneration, but also of standing solid against a public opinion that views them simply as criminals, an institutional apparatus that, especially after the killing of Spagnolo, has further sharpened its repressive weapons, and a football industry that tends to reduce the significance of being a fan with the result of relegating those attending matches to the role of mere consumers of a sport event.

Thus, being an ultras assumes its connotation — and this is the novelty following the Spagnolo killing — by membership of something almost akin to a resistance movement, struggling not against bourgeoisification, as has been argued (see Taylor 1971), but against the attempt to bourgeoisify the phenomenon of football support, and to destroy the popular culture of which the ultras, in Italy, feel themselves the legitimate repositories.

\textbf{Conclusions}

To end, we should like to dwell on two points. Firstly, to reiterate that in Italy, even though the self-producing mechanism of the ultras groups closely

\textsuperscript{10} We call the world of the ultras by the term ‘movement’ because that is how they define themselves, and also because this world does not greatly diverge from the definition given by Melucci of the concept of movement: “a collective phenomenon that manifests with a certain unity, but that within contains highly differentiated significances, forms of actions and modes of organisations” (Melucci 1982, p. 15).

\textsuperscript{11} In 1998, thanks also to the activity of the Progetto Ultras, the strategy of confrontation and dialogue centred on ultras themes has become a common practice. The topics dealt with at meetings concern the original mentality of the ultras, the rights of fans, and the defence of football fan culture in the face of the onslaught on the football industry.
recalled the principle of ordered segmentation introduced by Dunning, the social basis of the ultras has seldom predominantly consisted only of the lowest and rough strata of society. Indeed, from the only two studies describing the social origins of the ultras carried out in Bologna and Pisa (Roversi 1992; Francia 1994), it appears plain that there was, in the first case, a larger element of working-class extraction (but of the more integrated, less marginal sort), while in the second case the majority of the ultras actually originated from the town’s petit bourgeoisie.

Moreover, the very mechanism by which the ultras groups self-reproduced, through alliance of young groups that were independent but belonged to the same community, slipped sharply into crisis towards the end of the 1980s with the breaking-up of spaces for the social gathering of youth in the cities. Hence, the inverse process is nowadays much more likely — namely, that the stadium will take on the configuration of a place of primary sociality, and that within it a community will assume form and structure, able to affirm itself and to act even outside the stadium, in other places in the city. For, despite the signs of atomisation and disintegration we have mentioned, the stadium ends continue to represent one of the strong places of sociality.

The second point relates to violence in the world of football support. Despite the fall in incidents, in fact, this is a problem which in Italy has yet to be solved. Perhaps because, up to now, Italy’s sole reaction in order to stem the problem of violence by fans has been to adopt ‘law and order’ measures and to exert ever-greater social control. To sum up, the task of containing, suppressing and punishing football violence has been shifted to the police forces alone. And the result, as emerges from the latest data in our possession, continues to be serious tension around the stadiums and exacerbated conflict, not so much among rival fan groups but rather between ultras and police.

Therefore, in order to check violent behaviour more effectively, repressive measures should be accompanied by social intervention, with policies aiming not so much at control and repression as capable of analysing the reasons for this violence and, by long-term action, be brought to bear on the mentality underlying certain attitudes. In-depth knowledge of the stadium end phenomenon reveals a variegated, contradictory universe, a social gathering place for youth that also features positive values and powerful energies, of which the violence expressed on various occasions is only one aspect. Moreover, applying a policy of social intervention would enable a dialogue between self-organised fans and institutions to be started — for example, with the help and mediation of certain social agencies (as in some similar experiences now established in other countries, e.g. the German Fanprojekte, the Belgian
Fancoaching, the Football Supporters Association in Britain). This is an indispensable premise not only for creating a less tense atmosphere in stadiums, but also for avoiding the marginalisation of self-organised groups of population, whatever their actual origin and social composition.

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ANTONIO ROVERSI
Facoltà di Scienze della Formazione
Università di Bologna
Via Zamboni 34
40126 Bologna
Italy
E-mail: roversi@scform.unibo.it

CARLO BALESTRI
Archive of Football Support in Europe
Italian Association of Sport for All
Bologna
Italy
E-mail: roversi@scform.unibo.it
ABSTRACT. In Belgium the most important football matches are statistically recorded. Therefore this case is presented to demonstrate what can be learnt from statistics and other qualitative information in order to assess hooliganism: the number of hardcore elements, their size, their maximum capacity for mobilisation, the age groups involved, the degree of activism, the number and characteristics of the incidents involved, links with political crime and/or extremism, relationships and/or rivalries with other hardcore elements, the size of the police resources deployed in order to tackle them, and the impact of certain measures in the fight against hooliganism. A number of the characteristics of the phenomenon of hooliganism (renewal, adaptation and international relationships, in particular) mean that one has to go beyond the pure and simple canvas of a questionnaire with a statistical vocation. It is for this reason that the statistical information in Belgium has, from the very start (the 1991–1992 season) been backed up by telephone interviews with special witnesses from various Belgian hardcore elements.

KEY WORDS: hardcore elements, hooliganism, prevention policies, statistical analysis

It is helpful to remember just how deeply shocked public opinion, the authorities and the Belgian Police services were by the Heizel tragedy at the European Cup Final between Juventus of Turin and Liverpool in 1985. In 1991–1992, this shock led to the statistical recording of the most important football matches. This recording was officially set up by means of a circular from the Ministry of the Interior, which has since been replaced by the Circular dated 29 May 1995, relating to the gathering of data concerning the recording of events as part of administrative police work. The subject of this circular goes beyond the strict framework of football matches to touch upon all public order matters when the police services have been involved. In accordance with this circular, the police services must fill in a standard questionnaire about each event and their intervention at the time, a questionnaire which, in most cases, is fairly simple, but a more elaborate questionnaire in the cases of football matches in the Belgian First Division, the Belgian Second Division, the Belgian Cup and international competitions. This was the Complementary Recording Relating to Football Matches (or football recording).

1From the first round of the Belgian Cup (32 clubs) and providing that a First or Second Division club is involved.
2European Club competitions, the European Championship and the World Cup.

All of these questionnaires are centralised and analysed by the Support Division for Policing Policy of the General Department of Police Support (SGAP). The SGAP was set up by Royal Decree on 11 July 1994. Within it, the Support Division for Policing Policy has taken over some of the tasks of the former Criminality, Administrative Police and Administration of Criminal Justice sections.

FOOTBALL RECORDING

Football recording has allowed the centralisation and analysis of eight football seasons, in other words a total of 5,180 matches and 6,251 stewards.\(^3\) One of the limitations of this method of gathering data is that the matches (or any other public order event such as a market, a demonstration, a festival, etcetera) which take place in the absence of police stewardship are not taken into account in the analyses. The number of these matches amongst those which meet the criteria for recording is low: 35 Second Division matches from 1991–1992 to 1998–1999 plus five Second Division matches played in 1992–1993 the records for which have not reached us. All in all, the completeness of our database in relation to the matches actually played is 99.2%. For the last season recorded, this gives the following (see Table I).

The 673 matches recorded were the subject of 885 stewards records (547 from the local police and 238 from the national police). Each record is a stewardship operation carried out under the command of the police

\[
\begin{array}{cccc}
\text{First Division} & 309 & 45.9 & 309 & 45.5 & 419 & 47.3 \\
\text{Second Division} & 321 & 46.8 & 315^a & 47.3 & 398 & 45 \\
\text{Belgian Cup} & 33 & 4.9 & 33 & 4.9 & 47 & 5.3 \\
\text{International} & 16 & 2.4 & 16 & 2.4 & 21 & 2.4 \\
\text{Total} & 679 & 100 & 673 & 100 & 885 & 100 \\
\end{array}
\]

\(^a\)Six Second Division matches took place without the presence of any stewardship by the local and national police forces. We shall return to this aspect.

\(^3\)The organisation of the Belgian Police Force means that in the case of joint stewardship by the national police force and the local police, each retains its own command structure and, as a result, has a duty to record its own data.
force involved. Local and national police forces have jointly kept order (but always with two separate command structures) at 212 matches (that is to say 31.5% of the matches recorded).

In addition to this, a number of the characteristics of the phenomenon of hooliganism (renewal, adaptation and international relationships, in particular) mean that we have to go beyond the pure and simple canvas of a questionnaire with a statistical vocation. It is for this reason that this source of information has, from the very start (the 1991–1992 season) been backed up by telephone interviews with special witnesses from various Belgian hardcore elements. The result of the data gathering carried out in parallel with the purely statistical data gathering is an annual document called the Detailed Analysis of Hardcore Elements which combines statistical results such as, for example, the percentage of matches with incidents, and information gathered from the specification sheet giving the main characteristics of the hardcore elements (see Figure 1).

Maintaining this attempt to widen the horizon by observations on the ground, interviews, reviews of the press (national and foreign) and by the monitoring of Internet sites, allows us to take into account aspects which are less explored (e.g. the question of legal action as part of the keeping of order) or less well-known (very violent hooliganism in Eastern Europe) and a monitoring operation which is closer than statistical centralisation. These

<table>
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<tr>
<td>Class</td>
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<tr>
<td>Municipality</td>
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<tr>
<td>Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>Competition</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>First demonstration under current name</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Numerical strength of permanent core</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age group</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of type C permanent hardcore members</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum mobilisation capacity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identifying marks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruitment territory</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Specific recruitment places</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Nature of recruitment targets</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Positive relations with</td>
<td>national hardcore elements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>foreign hardcore elements</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Rivalry with</td>
<td>national hardcore elements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>foreign hardcore elements</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Specific behaviour and tactics at home matches</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Specific behaviour and tactics at away matches</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Communication means</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Transport means</td>
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<tr>
<td>Extremist relations</td>
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<td>Criminal relations</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Most frequently committed offences</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police method with most chance of success</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Trend</td>
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*Figure 1. Specification sheet.*
benefits are not purely intellectual; they create new sources of information for the police recipients, either information which I would call 'classical' (the sort that they are used to), or new information. Basically, we must not expect the police services to make original demands in relation to our statistical products, it is up to us to show what can be gained and to begin a dialogue with them on this subject. This statistical recording, completed with the gathering of information of a qualitative type, results in five standard products:

1. statements\textsuperscript{4} with comments for each half-season;
2. statements with comments for each season;
3. a report for each season (De Vreese et al. 1996–2000);
4. a detailed analysis of hardcore elements for each season;
5. monthly feedback regarding incidents and the investment of police services, which can be summed up in a partial list of the contents of the database.

One of the first things to be gained from these statistics and other qualitative information which has been patiently gathered, is a solid assessment of Belgian hooliganism: the number of hardcore elements, their size, their maximum capacity for mobilisation, the age groups involved, the degree of activism, the number and characteristics of the incidents involved, links with political crime and/or extremism, relationships and/or rivalries with other hardcore elements (Belgian or overseas), the size of the police resources deployed in order to tackle them, the impact of certain measures in the fight against hooliganism, etcetera. Such an elaborate, and sometimes laborious collection operation can be justified by the fact that hooliganism is a phenomenon which we can undoubtedly consider as being a social phenomenon, both before and after the Euro 2000 tournament. In fact, when the 5,180 matches recorded took place, amongst other things the police services counted 4,467 incidents and 296,743 police officers, working a total of 2,088,001 hours while the operational phase of these stewardship operations lasted. Figures such as these are striking because they represent around 56 incidents every month (without counting the truces in the winter and the summer) and the annual equivalent of 32,625 working days of eight hours each!

Beyond this observation, multiple analyses are possible. Hooliganism is, in fact, a complex phenomenon which is the result of local situations which are very different from one another from many points of view: the infrastructure of the stadium, the make-up of the hardcore element, the

\textsuperscript{4}The statements are exhaustive tables of all data gathered for the period concerned.
management of security and disorder by the various partners, etcetera. Nevertheless, the application of nation-wide measures cannot be considered to be effective if we cannot see overall tangible results, that it to say beyond the diversities of local situations. In fact this is one of the uses of statistics: to produce an overview which goes beyond and completes a multitude of views fragmented by local diversities (in one place we get good results, in another they are less good, somewhere else again it's hard to say, somewhere different still we can see negative effects; all undoubtedly with different instruments and/or perceptions, and this makes comparisons rather unreliable). Obviously we must not make the mistake of refusing to take any interest in local particularities. In fact, from the comparison of a success and a failure, we can draw a great deal of useful and relevant information in order to improve measures in the future. This type of work is, in fact, quite possible on the basis of national statistics because the data which has been recorded can still be analysed to the finest degree, that is to say the stewardship operated at a particular match, we can even go down to a specific incident recorded during this stewardship operation thanks to the fact that each incident must be described by means of 10 variables responding to the main questions such as what, who, where, when, against whom, and why.

HOOLIGANISM IN BELGIUM

The gathering and analysis of statistical and qualitative data have allowed us to see a new lull on the hooliganism front during the 1998–1999 season, the second recorded since 1991–1992. This lull is comparable to the first one, which was recorded during the 1994–1995 season: in comparison to the three previous seasons, the percentage of matches with incidents decreased by 18% both in 1994–1995 and in 1998–1999. Nonetheless, in 1998–1999, the lull only took place in the First Division, whereas in 1994–1995 it covered all types of competition recorded.

not sufficiently grounded on solid observations. A concurrent hypothesis is to attribute these fluctuations to conjectural factors. In fact, at the beginning of the 1994–1995 season, driven by the Ministry of the Interior, three measures aimed at fighting hooliganism were set in motion: the installation of cameras giving a complete view of the stadium but also permitting the taking of photos allowing subjects to be identified, a commitment from the clubs on stewards and the exclusion from stadiums of supporters with records as troublemakers. There was a lull in 1994–1995. In July 1995, during the summer truce, came the official announcement of the Euro 2000 tournament. There was an upsurge in 1995–1996. In 1998–1999, a new exclusion procedure was introduced, followed by another lull. 1999–2000 is the last season before the Euro 2000 tournament [. . .].

The lull from 1994–1995 was therefore a one-off, so what about the one from 1998–1999? As far as we know at the time of writing, nobody can answer these questions except by making dangerous prognostics. On the other hand, we can deal with another important question: “Have the various measures and initiatives taken had an overall impact on Belgian hooliganism?” I will try to answer this question by looking at three points:

1. reservations with regard to the instrument for the gathering of statistics;
2. measures for making stadiums secure;
3. matches with rival hardcore elements.

Reservations about the Instrument for the Gathering of Statistics

The detection of lulls, upsurges and periods of stability is essentially based on the activism of hardcore elements (we shall come back to this further on) and on three statistical indicators:

1. the percentage of matches where there are incidents;
2. the number of incidents per 10 matches;
3. the percentage of matches where there are people injured.

The monitoring of the evolution of the percentage of matches at which there are incidents (the first standard indicator) and of the number of incidents per 10 matches (the second standard indicator) makes it possible to assess the fluctuations of hooliganism in Belgium. From 1991–1992 to 1998–1999, overall these three indicators evolve in parallel, giving an overall scheme to which we can compare the trends by type of competition or type of match.

Having said that, responding to a question of the effectiveness of various policing, administrative or legal measures, by means of a statistical
instrument, even when it is complemented by other methods and sources of information, leads us to make a number of prior reservations. This is all the more necessary as this question is obviously very important for the people responsible at all levels. In fact, in this respect, we are not dealing with a simple academic exercise but also with supplying elements which may influence decisions which will have a certain social impact. Before we deal with the question of effectiveness, the various people responsible and decision-makers must not forget that other factors may also play a role. In other words, the statistical instrument, as is in fact the case with any instrument, makes a selection from amongst the information that it gathers. This selection, however obvious, should not mask the existence of other factors. The question “how can we take them into account from now on?” obviously remains unanswered. So, whether in 1994–1995 or in 1998–1999, the wide-ranging drop in activism by the hardcore elements could have been the result of a temporary loss of impetus in hooliganism caused by other factors such as the poor performances of Belgian clubs and the national side. In addition, all of these potential factors (whether measured or not) do not have the same effect on all of the hardcore elements or other unruly groups, at all types of matches. Therefore we must remain prudent when we are led to use this type of diagnosis. Nevertheless, I believe that even though the measures taken have had an appreciable impact, it must show through at a national statistical level. Can we conceive of a non-negligible impact which does not result in a notable and significant decrease in the number of incidents recorded and in the percentage of matches at which there are incidents?

Measures for Making Stadiums Secure

We were able to pose the question of the potential effect of measures taken, with statistics, for the first time following the 1994–1995 season (see De Vreese et al. 1996a, p. 103) because we then had data gathered in a standard method both before and after the introduction in First Division stadiums of cameras allowing a complete view of the stadium as well as the taking of photos for identification purposes, the deployment of stewards by the clubs and the exclusion of known troublemakers from stadiums. As these measures had only been introduced in First Division stadiums, a first comparison was made with Second Division matches. This was not a simplistic comparison which might have overlooked the enormous differences which separate these two divisions, whether with regard to what is at stake, the hardcore elements, the stadiums or the security measures, to mention some important aspects. In fact, this comparison had
allowed us to see, in 1994–1995, a decrease similar to the percentage of matches at which there were incidents in the First Division and in the Second Division, where these measures were not involved. We were therefore able to conclude that there were factors outside these measures which encouraged this first lull. More precisely, the measures introduced from the beginning of the 1994–1995 season (stewards, cameras and exclusions) aimed at better security in stadiums belonging to clubs playing in the First Division.\(^5\) As a result we could expect a decrease in the number of incidents in the stadiums belonging to First Division clubs, whether or not these were accompanied by lower reductions elsewhere. However, according to the data gathered by the statistical instrument, this was indeed the case (see De Vreese et al. 1996a, pp. 92–93), while the decrease seen in the Second Division only took place outside the stadiums. Nevertheless, the largest reduction seen in the First Division took place away from the stadiums, that is to say where incidents were less common.

Table II gives the evolution of the numbers of incidents according to where they took place in 1993–1994 and 1994–1995, overall and for the First and Second Divisions.

This series of results causes us to think that what took place in 1994–1995 is also a lull particular to hooliganism in addition to the actual effect of the measures taken. The upsurge seen in 1995–1996, that is to say, the season which immediately followed the official announcement of the Euro 2000 tournament, confirmed during the following two seasons causes us to think that although these measures had an effect in 1994–1995, this effect was a one-off and very limited. In fact, from one season to the next, in the First Division, the percentage of incidents occurring in the stadium is stable, totally regardless of any lulls and upsurges until the 1998–1999 season where a peak occurred which is unmatched both in the First Division and in the Second Division (see Figure 2)!

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**TABLE II**


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sites of Incidents</th>
<th>First Division</th>
<th>Second Division</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In the stadium</td>
<td>−31.5%</td>
<td>+ 5.3%</td>
<td>−23.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immediately surrounding area</td>
<td>−14.6%</td>
<td>−25.6%</td>
<td>−16.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Further afield</td>
<td>−58.1%</td>
<td>−23.5%</td>
<td>−47.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^3\)Obviously this corresponds to all First Division matches but also to international matches and most of the Belgian Cup matches.
How can we understand the fact that an arsenal of measures aiming at the security of stadiums which is being endlessly reinforced, should lead to a paradoxical result? In order to understand this, we must not forget that the hardcore elements are the main source (whether direct or indirect) of the incidents recorded. In other words, any large decrease in the number of incidents can only be the fruit of a comparable reduction in the activism of most of the hardcore elements. However, it is a well known fact that in order for incidents to take place outside of the favourable context of the match or the entrances and exits to the stadium (excitement, visibility of the opponent, mutual provocation, etcetera), requires greater dynamism from the hardcore elements. As a consequence, if the security measures have an effect (even limited in time) on the main troublemakers, it is hardly surprising that these should also be manifested in a reduction in the incidents requiring the most dynamism, organisation and motivation on the part of the hooligans. This is obviously valid for other supporters, whose level of excitement drops even more quickly. Basically, the stadium remains the main site of incidents, immediately followed but never supplanted by the immediately surrounding area. We cannot therefore rule out the possibility that any lull, even one with paradoxical characteristics, may be partially the fruit of the measures taken.

Thanks to the instrument for the gathering of statistics, we have specific information about one of the new measures taken to fight against hooliganism: stadium bans. What does it tell us? In 1994–1995, the proportion of matches at which exclusion measures were taken almost doubled: 23% of matches meeting the football recording criteria as against 11.5% on average in 1992–1993 and 1993–1994. In 1998–1999, according
to a number of policemen in charge of a hardcore element whose activism and/or number of members has decreased, the use of stadium bans, whether handed down by the Belgian football federation or by the legal authorities, is one of the elements which has allowed this favourable development. However, this use has doubled again in 1998–1999 (at 49.2% of matches) in relation to the previous season (26.3% of matches) and has increased both in the First Division, and in the Second Division and at Belgian Cup ties. It has also increased both at matches between two teams which do not have a hardcore element amongst their supporters (or matches with no hardcore element) and at matches between two teams where at least one of them does have a hardcore element amongst its supporters (or matches with hardcore elements; this distinction will be explained below). On two occasions, an intensification of the measures for banning or exclusion from stadiums apparently did have some effect. What is more, the two upsurges and the two lulls are almost identical! This is worth thinking about. Let us take as our starting point the evolution of the percentage of matches with incidents and of matches with stadium bans.6

First of all we can see that in 1995–1996 and in 1997–1998, stadium bans were no less widespread than in 1994–1995, the opposite of what is the case for incidents (see Figure 3). As a consequence, if this measure actually was effective, then its effectiveness has not lasted for very long. Do we need to return to the same conclusion for the next few seasons? Only the future will tell. We therefore come back to this slightly discouraging conclusion. Will we have to be constantly reinforcing the arsenal of

![Figure 3. Matches with incidents and matches with stadium bans in percentages.](image)

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6From 1992–1993 onwards because this question was not posed during the 1991–1992 season.
measures in the fight against hooliganism? Is this phenomenon really so enduring in Belgium? Nonetheless, stadium bans appear to us to be a promising measure because they are being increasingly used on the ground and are having an effect. So, it seems to us appropriate to encourage this while taking into account the fact that the hardcore elements have capacities for adaptation which may counter the measures taken against them. This has been the case when most of them abandoned insignia on their clothing which made it possible to identify them. On the other hand, the maintenance in the medium and long term of the effectiveness of a measure in the fight against hooliganism requires a constant investment from the partners involved because the weakening of one link in the chain carries a risk of rendering the measure ineffective, and the hardcore elements would be sure to take advantage of this.

**Matches with Rival Hardcore Elements**

Apart from their ‘natural’ distribution in the Belgian First Division, Second Division, Belgian Cup and international competitions, we can classify the matches recorded according to the existence of a hardcore element amongst the supporters attending the match. This second distribution key has allowed us to see that the lull in 1994–1995 was not as widespread as it appeared at first sight. In fact, the situation had not actually improved at matches between two teams both with a hardcore element amongst their supporters (or matches with rival hardcore elements). We see the same thing in 1998–1999. More precisely, in spite of all the overall fluctuations which have affected Belgian hooliganism, the presence on both sides of hardcore elements will always carry the same risks. In fact, during each of the eight seasons recorded, incidents have occurred at more than six matches out of 10 with rival hardcore elements with a very consistent average of two incidents per match and a percentage of acts of violence which is always greater than 60% of the acts recorded (without being the subject of a report). This stability is all the more amazing because Belgian hardcore elements form a group whose seasonal changes are not negligible: hardcore elements appear, break up, halt their activities definitively or temporarily or follow their favourite team when it is promoted or relegated. This leads us to think that the heart of Belgian hooliganism (the animosity between two hardcore elements) remains solidly anchored. And this is not for any lack of initiatives on the part of the various authorities or police services. Each Belgian hardcore element is followed by one or two teams of ‘spotters’ (plain-clothes policemen). Since 1988, the various Ministers of the Interior have drawn up many circulars.
In order to contain it (hooliganism), the federal powers and football clubs, through the intermediary of the Belgian Union, have agreed upon considerable efforts and investments as far as security both around and inside stadiums. Through a number of royal decrees and ministerial circulars, the Minister of the Interior has imposed and begun measures on various levels: the infrastructure of stadiums, the sale of tickets, the exchange of information or the maintaining of public order. (Paulus 1997)

Since the 1994–1995 season, First Division stadiums have been fitted with surveillance cameras and provided with stewards. A number of prosecution services have designated a magistrate to be specifically in charge of any hooliganism which takes place in his area. This magistrate is on duty at football matches (in 1998–1999, at 15.5% of First Division matches, 8.9% of Second Division matches, 15.2% of Belgian Cup matches and 37.5% of international matches; that is to say, at a total of 87 out of the 673 matches during this season, which represents 12.9% of them). The presence of a magistrate increases the effectiveness of the legal work of the police services. The studying of First Division matches with the most risks of group incidents has shown that between 1991–1992 and 1995–1996, the presence of a magistrate multiplies the percentage of matches at which legal arrests have been made by 2.3 (see De Vreese et al. 1998a, p. 18). Parliament passed the Law of 21 December 1998 relating to security at football matches (which was published in the Belgian Monitor, 3 February 1999), with regard to which the Association of Public Prosecutors at the Court of Appeal drew up a circular dated 27 January 1999. This list of initiatives aimed at fighting hooliganism is far from exhaustive, it only aims to highlight the capacity for resistance in its purest expression: the will to deal with opposing groups. Matches with rival hardcore elements are obviously situations which are favourable to violent manifestations of hooliganism: two rival groups and a sometimes impressive number of forces of law and order and private resources. What drives the hardcore elements is the search for supremacy over rival hardcore elements, the pleasure of confrontation, the hatred of the rival. This is certainly an inter-group dynamic and not personal animosity, even if this is one of the factors which stimulate violence. These confrontations, their preparations, meetings, ambushes, missed or aborted opportunities show that hooliganism can be compared to a war game in which the individual pleasure of violence and

\[\text{In 1998–1999, we recorded an average of 18 police officers at matches without hardcore elements, 52 at matches with local hardcore elements, 78 at matches where the away team had a hardcore element but 155 at matches with rival hardcore elements; that is to say three times more than for matches where only the local side is supported by a hardcore element and three times more than matches where only the away team is supported by a hardcore element.}\]
fighting finds expression. Hooliganism is not the simple occurring of incidents committed by groups or individuals. It is a phenomenon of groups that have split off from a wider collective and, because of this very fact, adopt their own standards which are unacceptable to society and the majority of the original collective. My basic hypothesis is that this is a male group phenomenon, where the groups are rivals, persistent and informally organised and not the simple occurring of incidents committed by groups or individuals.

What Lessons Can We Learn from These Three Elements

Belgian hooliganism is alive, the arsenal of measures is becoming more and more diversified in order to try and hit troublemakers on their weak points as early as possible. It is for this reason that the Law dated 21 December 1998 relating to security at football matches introduced administrative penalties for anyone contravening these provisions, whether they were match organisers (Article 18) or supporters (Article 24). Article 28 specifies, in actual fact, that the administrative penalty is enforceable one month after the offender has been notified of it. Any appeal is, nevertheless, not a stay. Administrative penalties incurred by anyone committing “deeds which may disturb the progress of a national football match or international football match” (section III), that is to say, throwing objects, illegally going onto the pitch or into various areas of the stadium, are an administrative fine of between 10,000 and 200,000 francs and/or a stadium ban of between three months and five years.

The effectiveness expected from stadium bans is based on the observation that most members of hardcore elements are actual supporters of their teams. We can therefore expect them to be more inclined to respect the law and public order when threatened with being banned from entering the stadium where their team plays. If we start from the hypothesis that a group is only really active in the presence of its leaders, banning 225 to 245 of their catalogued permanent ‘type C’ members from entering all Belgian football stadiums for a sufficient period could be highly effective. At least in theory, because this could create a second wave of shifting incidents to outside the stadiums, at least initially, which is not really to be recommended

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8In certain groups, a few women (less than 10%) do actually take part in the incidents (some people call them ‘muses’). It is probable that these women make up a more homogenous population than male hooligans because they have had to integrate into an activity, into groups which are strongly marked by macho-type virility (see Haynes 1993, pp. 55–76).
so close to the Euro 2000 tournament, during which thousands of supporters and hooligans of various nationalities will be present over large areas of Dutch and Belgian territory. Nonetheless, is this not a road we can go down when we know that various local and national police officers specialising in hooliganism have for many years recommended stadium bans? In any case, we must observe that in this case, the number of supporters excluded is not large. It appears obvious that the ever-wider use of a measure must be made as part of a series of actions where the various national or local partners (police, services and authorities, football federation and clubs, stewards or fan coaching) must undertake concerted action.

**WHO ARE THE BELGIAN HARDCORE ELEMENTS?**

First of all, what do we mean by a hardcore element? A **hardcore element is a group of people who commit organised acts of violence during the matches of the team they support.**

Belgian hardcore elements are obviously a long way from being able to rival their English, German or Dutch 'big brothers'. However, they are still far from negligible. In fact, in eight seasons, the police services have recorded no less than 4,240 incidents at 3480 First Division, Second Division or Belgian Cup matches\(^9\) and international competitions where there is a hardcore element. This represents an average of 530 incidents per season (424 in 1998–1999, a season during which there was a lull) or 1.2 incidents per match at which there are hardcore elements. Of course, incidents also occurred at matches where there was no hardcore element present, that is to say between teams whose supporters do not include hardcore elements but there are no common measurements for this. In fact, matches at which there is no hardcore element have recorded, keeping things in proportion, 9.4 times fewer incidents than matches where there is a hardcore element. These matches account for a total of 94.9% of the 4,467 incidents recorded at all matches, whereas they only represent 67.2% of the actual matches.

The Belgian First and Second Division each contain 18 teams. In 1998–1999, of these 36 teams, 13 were supported by a hardcore element as defined above, nine in the First Division and four in the Second Division. In other words, the penetration rate of hooliganism in 1998–1999 was 36.1% (50% in the First Division and 22.2% in the Second Division). Each of these 13 hardcore elements is broadly speaking made up of permanent members

\(^9\)From the first round of the Belgian Cup (32 clubs) and providing that a First or Second Division club is involved.
(those who attend all home matches as part of the hardcore element) and others who are less regular or even occasional. According to the estimates provided by the various police departments in charge of these 13 hardcore elements, the total number of permanent members totals between 800 and 1,000 people. Amongst them, these estimates show the presence of approximately 225 to 245 supporters of type C.\textsuperscript{10} The numbers of these 13 hardcore elements vary greatly from one to another. In actual fact, the size of the permanent hardcore varies from three to 160 people, including from zero to 50 of type C.

Hardcore elements vary not only as far as their permanent numbers are concerned but also with regard to their activism. What do we mean by activism? The activism of a hardcore element can be calculated by means of a percentage of the side’s matches at which group incidents occur, home matches and away matches taken separately. Let us take an actual but anonymous example,\textsuperscript{11} hardcore element X is one of the most feared in Belgium. During 1998–1999, when its team played 22 First Division, Belgian Cup and/or European Cup matches at home, X was responsible for group incidents at nine of these 22 matches, and it therefore obtains a ‘home’ score of 40.9\% (the highest for the season). Away from home, it was responsible for group incidents at seven of its side’s 18 matches, and it therefore obtains an ‘away’ score of 38.9\% (joint third). In both cases, it is in the 25+ category (strictly more than 25\% and with a maximum of 50\%), and now belongs to class I of hardcore elements (the one comprising the most active hardcore elements, that is to say those which have disrupted more than 25\% of matches played by their team at home and/or away). In total, we can distinguish four classes of hardcore element (from class I to class IV). The 13 Belgian hardcore elements from 1998–1999 can be broken down as follows:

- 3 class I hardcore elements
- 3 class II hardcore elements, including 1 from the Second Division
- 4 class III hardcore elements, including 2 from the Second Division
- 3 class IV hardcore elements, including 1 from the Second Division

\textsuperscript{10}Violent people’ under Recommendation 1/97 concern the use of template forms for the exchanging of police information about high risk sporting events adopted on 5–6 June 1997 at the 17th meeting of the Standing Committee (T-RV) of the European Convention on violence and spectator overflow at sporting events and in particular football matches of the Council of Europe.

\textsuperscript{11}This information is confidential and strictly reserved for the police authorities and services.
Class IV hardcore elements are not very active in comparison to those from class I, since they have only disrupted a maximum of 12.5% of the matches played by their team at home and/or away.

Earlier we mentioned the fact that 1998–1999 turned out to be a season during which there was a lull as 1994–1995 had previously been. In both cases, we were able to show that the joint decreases in the number of incidents and the percentage of matches at which there were incidents, were the result of a lull on the hooliganism front. Of the 13 hardcore elements in 1998–1999, nine underwent a drop in activism in comparison with the previous season, to which we must also add the disappearance of another hardcore element. What is more, in eight cases out of nine, the drop in activism was manifested in a relegation to a lower class (from class I to class II or III, for example). Nonetheless, however important it may have been, this lull was not general since at the same time, we saw the appearance of a new hardcore element in the Second Division and an increase in activism of the three others, including two which were enough to justify promotion to a higher class. Result: in 1998–1999, we reached the lowest number of hardcore elements amongst First Division and Second Division supporters.

Table III gives, for each season, the total number of hardcore elements, the number belonging to each class and the number of hardcore elements rising in relation to the previous season or which have emerged. In comparison with the lull in 1994–1995, 1998–1999 was marked by the more reliable number of hardcore elements, which is a good omen for the current season!

THE RISK OF GROUP INCIDENTS

In the above, we have spoken of the first two factors for the distribution of matches recorded: the types of competition and the existence of hardcore

<table>
<thead>
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<th>TABLE III</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Season</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91–92</td>
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<tr>
<td>92–93</td>
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<td>93–94</td>
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<td>94–95</td>
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<td>96–97</td>
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<tr>
<td>97–98</td>
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<tr>
<td>98–99</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
elements. In the course of the analysis of the 1994–1995 season, a third distribution key was created, known as ‘risk of group incidents’. These three distribution keys govern the structure of the season and half-season statements mentioned above.

But firstly, a brief presentation of the second distribution key. First of all we can distinguish the matches at which there is no hardcore element from the matches where there is a hardcore element. The matches where there is a hardcore element are all matches where at least one of the teams has, amongst its supporters, a group of people who commit organised acts of violence at this team’s matches. We then subdivide matches where there is a hardcore element into three exclusive sub-categories, according to whether one or other of the teams involved (or both of them) have amongst their supporters such a group of people. This results in an exclusive distinction between four types of match:

- matches with no hardcore element;
- matches where there is a hardcore element supporting the home side only;
- matches where there is a hardcore element supporting the away side only;
- matches where there are rival hardcore elements.

**The Third Distribution Key**

While this second distribution key requires a distinction to be drawn between hardcore elements supporting the home team and hardcore elements supporting the away team, the distribution key ‘risks of group incidents’ is based on the four classes of hardcore elements (classes I to IV as mentioned in the previous paragraph). First of all, an important comment. The new distribution key does not deal only with Belgian ‘domestic’ matches, that is to say games in the First Division, the Second Division or the Belgian Cup. International matches are not taken into account because we lack the necessary information about foreign risk groups. This third distribution key is made up of an ordinal scale with five degrees of risk over which domestic matches are distributed:

A. matches at which there is a very high risk of group incidents; those between two teams supported by a class I hardcore element;
B. matches at which there is a high risk of group incidents, like type A, where there are rival hardcore elements;
C. matches at which there is an average risk of group incidents;
D. matches at which there is a low risk of group incidents;
E. matches at which there is a very low risk of group incidents.\textsuperscript{12}

\textit{Matches at Which There Is a Very High Risk of Group Incidents}

These distinctions appear a little abstract at first sight. Two examples will quickly dispel this impression:

- the police investment assessed by the average number of man/hours;
- the problems encountered by the police services assessed by the rate of incidents per 10 matches.

In the reports devoted to the 1995–1996, 1996–1997 and 1997–1998 seasons (De Vreese et al. 1996b, pp. 41–42, 1998a, pp. 57–58, 1998b, pp. 43–44), these matches were the subject of specific analyses dealing mainly with incidents and their police management (see Figures 4 and 5). Amongst domestic matches, matches at which there were very high risks of group incidents are constantly detached from the others by more numerous and more serious incidents, committed at the instigation of hardcore elements

\textit{Figure 4. Average numbers of man/hours per match from 1991–1992 to 1998–1999, according to the risk of group incidents.}

\textsuperscript{12}When we talk about risks, we can envisage two things which need to be clearly distinguished. Firstly, the probability that an event may take place; secondly, the seriousness of this event. So, some incidents may be highly unlikely but we must nevertheless take precautions because of their seriousness. In our assessment of degrees of risk at matches where there are national hardcore elements, we have taken as a basis only the proportions of matches where group incidents have taken place. So, we are assessing the distribution of these events \textit{a posteriori} and not their relative seriousness.
which are particularly active and redoubtable. This situation, further amplified by the great popularity of the teams involved and by the high stakes at the matches between them, led the people responsible for the keeping of order to deploy clearly more manpower and to make more frequent use of police equipment and repressive measures. In 1997–1998, we were able to observe that the 144 matches of type A recorded from 1991–1992 to 1997–1998, which only represent 3.2% of the total of 4,507 matches then registered, were the scene of the following: 14.2% of incidents (4.4 times more); and 20.9% of reported offences (6.5 times more).

These matches therefore form a concentration of problems alongside which other matches look (almost) insignificant. And this is not for any lack of comparatively large investments as shown by their policing and dealt with from three different angles we obtained the following results.

- Investment in time and manpower in relation to other Belgian matches:
  - deployment of 4.5 times more police officers,
  - who worked 5.2 times more hours on the ground,
  - stewardship services which were 1.6 times longer.
- Investment in resources (Table IV hardly needs any comments).
- Administrative and legal intervention (Figure 6 speaks for itself).

**Conclusion**

Whether we are dealing with the investment in personnel, in time, in equipment or in repressive measures, it adds up to the problems encountered at matches at which there is a very high risk of group incidents. These problems appear only to have been contained by these resources, these measures and these
TABLE IV
Matches with various resources used (in percentages) and the ratio between the two values observed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% Type A</th>
<th>% Other national matches</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sprinkler vehicles</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tear gas</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friesian horses</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency lighting</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truncheons</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horses</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handcuffs</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radar barriers</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dogs</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation equipment</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

investments. And yet [...] calm is definitely more rare here than elsewhere.

So, Belgian hooliganism is disparate, mainly fed by a few groups which are more active or more redoubtable than the others (broadly speaking, hardcore elements of class I and II). These groups are not always the same from season to season, their activism is often in proportion to the success or, inversely, the successive defeats suffered by their favourite teams.

I would like to end my contribution by quoting other analyses of hooliganism based on Belgian statistics. Analyses published in the reports dealing with the previous seasons but also analyses which, due to lack of time or limitations in the current questionnaire, are still at the draft stage. The aim is to show, mainly to the police authorities and services, that the

![Figure 6. Percentage of matches with repressive measures from 1991–1992 to 1997–1998.](image-url)
statistical analyses drawn up based on their work are not a product which can be taken or left but a source of new lessons about something which takes up so much of their time every day: hooliganism and its policing.

**Other Analyses**

Up until now, we have dealt here with a small number of aspects of Belgian hooliganism and its monitoring by the Support Division relating to SGAP Policy. Many others have been dealt with in various publications or can be envisaged alongside recurrent analyses, which are now almost classical. It is obvious that the forthcoming Euro 2000 tournament is an important vector in the choice of analyses carried out recently. So, in the 1997–1998 report, international matches were put under the magnifying glass in order to learn lessons for the Euro 2000 tournament, whether from the point of view of the behaviour of the hardcore elements or policing techniques. In the 1996–1997 report, the support of a psychology student for a month made it possible to integrate a very rewarding ergonomic point of view with notions such as the interface police work/environment, the distinction between latent error and active error, risk, the problem of hierarchical directives, specifically. In this same report, legal proceedings at football matches are discussed with the underlying question: why are there so few legal proceedings in relation to the number of offences committed? In the report on the last season recorded, 1998–1999 (De Vreese et al. 2000), there is a succinct list of Internet websites dealing with hooliganism (a brief version of this list is incorporated here, see below). Internet remains a question mark: what will be the impact of this rapidly developing medium on the Euro 2000 tournament?

One of the broad aspects of the statistical analyses to be envisaged is the finely tuned and specific assessment of the various measures or intervention in the fight against trouble at football matches. Up until now, we have had to make do with comparing the numbers and percentages of incidents to numbers and percentages of stadium bans, for example, without being able to make any connections between the two. The same goes for arrests (both administrative and legal) and incidents. There is a lack of connection between the multiple aspects which would allow more finely tuned assessments, notably in terms of success percentages, e.g. amongst the supporters of such and such a team, 10 are banned from stadiums, how many of them have attempted to get into the stadium at such and such a match? Have they been involved in any incidents? How many of them were near the stadium during such and such a match? Were they involved in
any incidents? This would allow us to attribute, with a greater degree of certainty, the (partial) cause of a lull or an upsurge to such and such a measure, such and such an intervention. This would also allow us to precisely assess the actual use of measures which have been legally introduced.

Obviously designing new analyses can only be done with what this instrument supplies us in terms of information. After adapting the questionnaire in 1993–1994, it was not developed for reasons which fall well outside the framework of this article. It has become out of date; it does not allow us to record precisely new and important aspects such as stewarding or new administrative penalties. We will nevertheless retain it as it is until the 2000–2001 season, in order to guarantee a reliable ‘before and after the Euro 2000 tournament’ assessment. Then, the objective at which we are aiming is to make it into more and more of a police instrument, that is to say of ever-greater use to police officers and authorities.

REFERENCES


Paulus, E., Stewards, exclusions, local consultative council for security at football matches. In the folder of documents distributed by the Police Générale du Royaume (National Police Force) at the information event for security delegates and chief stewards on 14/06/97.

APPENDIX

In the most recent publication of Stéfan De Vreese et al. (2000), a list of website pertaining to football/hooliganism is published. If there are other websites, or if addresses have changed
he would like to be informed (e-mail: sgap@skynet.be, fax: +32 2 5002640). A brief selection of this list is published here:

Planet Hooligan (RFA), http://www.hooligan.de
Hooligan Ultra Homepage, http://members.tripod.com/~ultrahool/huh.htm
Ultras Germany, http://www.fortunecity.de/olympia/zaharias/80/start.htm
Generation Luzifer, http://gl-ultras.virtualave.net/
Degerloch on tour, http://members.aol.com/svkpeter/
Hungarian Ultra’s, http://hungarian.ultras.8m.com/
Liste de hooligans inscrits (plusieurs pays), http://members.tripod.com/~rzeznik/index.html
Site Ultra, http://www.tifonet.it/
http://www.geocities.com/Colosseum/Stadium/3763/hoolie.htm
French Ultras, http://perso.wanadoo.fr/ultra-sup/
German Ultras, http://users.odn.de/~odn02492/ultras-web/index.html
http://www.geocities.com/Colosseum/Bench/2944/links.html
http://www.geocities.com/Colosseum/Field/6261/index1.htm
http://perso.club-internet.fr/suprapsg/ultrasring.html
http://www.wugnet.baynet.de/mitglieder/munichmaniacs/frames1.htm
http://www.geocities.com/Colosseum/Loge/4076/hooligan.html

**Algemene Politie Steun Dienst**

Rue Royale 47
1000 Bruxelles
Belgium

E-mail: s-de-vreese@swing.be
The opening of the International Victimology Website (IVW) on 1 June 1999 is another milestone in the international action plan for victim support. The website is an initiative of the United Nations (UN) Center for International Crime Prevention, the World Society of Victimology and the Netherlands Ministry of Justice. This profile of the IVW will briefly describe the background, aims and offerings of this new information source.

The IVW is being developed in response to the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice recommendation for "the continued development of a database on practical national experiences, relevant case law and legislation and on the use and application of the UN Declaration, taking into account different systems and traditions, including indigenous and customary justice practices" (Resolution E/CN.15/1998/L/10, 28 April 1998).

Victim issues are high on the UN agenda. Expert meetings on the implementation of the *UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power*, adopted by the General Assembly in 1985, have resulted in the *Guide for Policymakers on the Implementation of the UN Declaration* (1998) and the *Handbook on Justice for Victims: On the Use and Application of the UN Declaration* (1998). Victim support was one of the key topics on the agenda of the UN Congress of Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice held in Vienna, Austria, 10–17 April this year. The *Preliminary Draft of the Vienna Declaration on Crime and Justice: Meeting the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century* (1999), transmitted to this UN Congress by the Economic and Social Council, contains a point concerning victims of crime. Plans for a UN Fund for Support of Victims of Transnational Crime are now under way. These are a few of the highlights of the work programme of the UN to assist victims of crime and abuse of power.

Another international organisation concerned with improving the plight of the victim and instrumental in getting the IVW started is the World Society of Victimology. The Society, founded in 1979, aims to encourage victim-related research and to advance co-operation between all who share concern for the problems of victims. The Society sponsors several activities
to further its aims: an international symposium for victimology every three years, international workshops and seminars, and publication twice yearly of a newsletter, *The Victimologist*. The Society now has nearly 500 members in 65 countries and continues to grow.

The Netherlands Ministry of Justice has made a commitment to setting up and funding the IVW project for an initial period of three years. The challenge of developing this new resource has been assigned to the Research and Documentation Centre (WODC), the research unit of the Ministry of Justice.

Although not yet universally available, the Internet is fundamentally changing the way information is accessed and disseminated and is therefore the vehicle of choice for this new resource. The global reach of the Internet means that a wide community—from researchers and practitioners to interested citizens—can tap resources worldwide and communicate rapidly, easily, and inexpensively. The potential user base for IVW will grow as this technology becomes more accessible. This victimology knowledge link is freely available on the Web.

The website aims to facilitate implementation of the *UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power* by disseminating information about current victimology research and about what works, what doesn’t, what’s promising in victim services, prevention of crime and abuse of power, and by promoting international exchange of expertise and experience. IVW focuses on victims as defined by the *UN Declaration*: “persons who, individually or collectively, have suffered harm, including physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental rights, through acts or omissions that are in violation of criminal laws, including those proscribing abuse of power”.

IVW offers:

- easy access to UN and other documents related to victims of crime and abuse of power;
- two IVW databases:
  a) Ongoing Victimology Research Database;
  b) Victim Services and Victimization Prevention Database;
- victimology links;
- news and bulletin board services;
- news flashes.

**UN and Other Documents Related to Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power**

Both the *Guide for Policymakers on the Implementation of the UN Declaration* and the *Handbook on Justice for Victims: On the Use and Application of the UN Declaration* can be viewed and downloaded from
the IVW UN documents pages. Translations of these documents into other languages are now in preparation and will be offered as soon as they are available.

Documents from other sources are also being added either on site or as links. Brief descriptions are provided of each document listed. The following are just a few examples of the documents you can find listed under 'other documents': *Crimes against the South African Business Sector* (1999), *The Second International Crime (Victim) Survey in Johannesburg* (1996), *The International Crime (Victim) Survey in Maseru, Lesotho* (1998); the European Forum for Victim Services statements (*Statement of Victims’ Rights in the Process of Criminal Justice; The Social Rights of Victims of Crime; Statement of Victims’ Rights to Standards of Service*); *International Victimology: Selected Papers from the Eighth International Victimology Symposium, 21–26 August 1994, Adelaide*. Major recent additions to the documents section include data from the benchmark dissertation research on the implementation of Council of Europe Recommendation (85)11 (on the position of the victim in the framework of criminal law and procedure) in 22 European jurisdictions carried out by Marion Brienen and Ernestine Hoegen (Tilburg, The Netherlands: Tilburg University, Dissertation, June 2000). You can view documents and download them to your computer in a variety of formats.

**Two IVW Databases**

In the start-up stages of IVW, the focus has been on getting two databases up and running: the Victimology Research Database (comprising brief descriptions of victim-related research in progress) and the Victim Services and Victimization Prevention Database (containing information about the effectiveness of victim services and prevention of crime and abuse of power).

Programmes and practices in the field are often established on the basis of research or are modified and replicated following evaluations. This link between practice and research suggests the need for a database of information about ongoing research in victimology. The Victimology Research Database has evolved in response to this need.

Evidence about the effectiveness of victim services and victimisation prevention is becoming increasingly more widely sought and applied by funding agencies and practitioners alike. The scarcity of data on the effectiveness of victim services programmes is a continuing problem. In developing IVW, this was and remains a major consideration. The Victim Services and Victimization Prevention Database was set up to pull together
information from the field about programmes and strategies that show promise of success, to put it in one place, and to make it widely available. Everyone, no matter what their field or sector, can glean ideas to apply within their particular area.

Researchers, practitioners, agencies and others share an interest in generating reliable, up-to-date evidence relevant to victimology, services for victims/witnesses and prevention of crime and abuse of power. By sharing experience and identifying important effects of intervention (good and bad) we can better serve victims. Plans for new research/services/programmes/policy/legislation will not be well informed without insight into previous research and experience. Consequently, researchers, policymakers and funding bodies will miss promising leads and embark on studies asking questions that have perhaps already been answered or on less promising projects.

To ensure that the results of their work can be widely disseminated, IVW requests researchers and practitioners to submit information about their projects and programmes to the databases. Database submission forms are available on site and the completed forms can be submitted electronically or by e-mail. These databases are totally dependent on information received from the field. Ultimately, their success will depend on the willingness of researchers, practitioners and agencies to share information with each other. Contact details are provided to make it possible to get in touch directly with the individuals involved in the research and programmes. To make these databases as useful as possible, input from the field is vital!

Victimology Links

The goal of the victimology links page is to provide researchers, practitioners and policymakers with a convenient collection of web pages related to victim issues. For the present, the information and resources have been arranged according to country. Eventually this page will include a variety of links that allows for better organisation and presentation. Until then we hope visitors to the links page will find the current page a reasonable start. Using the Victimology Links page you can locate research tools, information about crime victim compensation programmes worldwide and other useful online information and resources.

News and Bulletin Board Services

The news and bulletin board services have been created to post messages of interest to all who are working in or associated with victimology and
allied professions around the world. The news page contains information about upcoming events. Bulletin Board listings are arranged under six headings: information requests, professional development, publications, programme/office resources, calls for comments/suggestions, upcoming events, other.

News Flashes

IVW regularly sends news flashes to those who are on our e-mailing list to pass on news of interest to and from the field and report major additions to the site. If you would like to receive these announcements, simply request the webmaster to add you to our list.

http://www.victimology.nl — Bookmark this site for easy access to victimology information!

You are invited to explore IVW and perhaps learn more about victimology, victim services and victimisation prevention worldwide. Please e-mail us with suggestions of topics and links you would like to see included. The International Victimology Website Team will welcome your help in making the site as useful, comprehensive and international as possible.

Research and Documentation Centre (WODC)
P.O. Box 20301
2500 EH The Hague
The Netherlands
Fax: +31-70-3707948
E-mail: information@victimology.nl
SELECTED ARTICLES AND REPORTS

This section contains a selection of abstracts of reports and articles on the central topic of this issue. The aim of publishing these short summaries is to generate and disseminate additional information. Most of the articles have been published in other journals in the English language, although we aim to incorporate French, Dutch or German literature on the subject. General information on criminal policy and research in Europe can be supplied by the WODC Documentation Service (infodesk@wodc.minjust.nl). Single copies of the articles can (when used for individual study or education) be provided by the WODC Documentation Service.


“Hooligans, autonomous people and police officers: violence and police conduct in riot situations”. The author has systematically researched the interaction between the police and the public, with special attention to football hooliganism. He has observed several ‘risk’ matches and focuses on the presence of away-supporting hooligans, preventative and reactive policing, the differences between supporters and hooligans, possibilities for influencing them by the police, policies to prevent violence and the execution thereof.


The introductory section clarifies the ways in which the terms ‘punishment’ and ‘victimisation’ are applied in this article. The next section of the article evaluates the relevance or otherwise of the socio-cultural theory advanced by Giddens to the study of sports law. Following on from there, the author attempts to demonstrate how modernist discourse of the ‘civilising process’ mistakenly focuses exclusively on the punishment of the offender while being completely silent about victimisation as mere punishment. From this, the article attempts a detailed analysis of specific football penalties to show that what is taken for granted by modernity (the codified offence) is often problematic. Before the conclusion, the article moves beyond the sphere of sports to demonstrate that the criminal justice system could be better understood (in certain instances) from the point of view of collective responsibility which is reflected in the team spirit found in sports, but which the discourse of the Enlightenment defines away from the ‘rational’ administration of justice.


Gary Armstrong and Dick Hobbs consider police response to football hooliganism. They argue that politicians and the media helped to create a moral panic which justified the creation of specialised police surveillance units directed against a marginal group. The low status of the group made possible police actions that would not have been publicly supported against other groups such as labour unions. They also note how covert means lend themselves well to the dramatisation of the fight against crime and a struggle between good and evil. Heroic police facing great peril is well suited to mass media glorification.

This report, on football hooligans/football criminals, consists of two parts. M. Bol gives expert evidence on football hooligans, based on interviews with police officers, stewards, people involved in the safety of stadiums and a public prosecutor. These interviews have provided an analysis of the profile and motives of perpetrators of organised violence at football matches. The second part consists of an annotated bibliography compiled by C. van Netburg, in which literature on the subject over the years 1985–1997 is summarised.


"Today we'll lie doggo: a cross-national study of hooliganism and policy". This sociological research focuses on the physical and verbal acts of hooliganism in England and the Netherlands. Apart from a comparison of the situation in these two countries it traces the origins of hooliganism and the interference of racism, extremist ideas and anti-Semitism in football. Attention is also paid to the policies to beat hooliganism and racism in football, and preventative policies directed at verbal acts.


Hooliganism is known under several names and across a wide geographical area, *hooligans* in Britain, Germany and the North of France, *siders* in Belgium and the Netherlands, *ultras* in Spain, Italy, Portugal and Southern France, and *barras/favelas* in South America. The 'crisis' in violence is characterised by the time (the football match), the place (the stadium), and the actors (the supporters). In this article the phenomenon of hooliganism is explained on five levels: the individual, the group, the social group, the crowd, and the social class. The author describes these levels and also their interrelations, referring to international literature and specifically to the Belgian situation.


In this article several Greek studies on hooliganism are described. A research group was formed under the direction of the author of this article to research different aspects of the problem. In view of this objective, seven particular projects were planned and carried out, the principal one being that which was set up to investigate the behaviour and attitudes of hard core fans.


In November 1995 a conference was organised in Liège with the title 'Which supporters for the year 2000', to celebrate five years of 'fan coaching' with the Standard Football Club. Several Belgian as well as European experts discussed large sports events (the forthcoming Euro 2000), the security measures and the interaction of sport and people from diverse angles.

This volume tries to answer the question as to why uncontrollable violence occurs with sporting events, and more particularly in football stadiums. Ten experts focus on various subjects, such as extremist supporters, from gang to social group, football match statistics, public order and the tifosi, culture, civilisation and the sociology of sport, media coverage of protest events, preventive measures, safety in stadiums, a European policing strategy towards hooliganism and the 'geography of fear'.


This book is a collection of nine essays, seven of them published here for the first time. The major questions addressed include the rise and types of football hooliganism, its relationship to social class, trends over the past century (including the rise of hooligan gangs), the role of the tabloid press, the critique of social psychological and alternative sociological theories of hooliganism, the comparison of English and continental hooliganism, the effectiveness of crowd-control techniques, and controversies surrounding proposals to control hooliganism by issuing national identity cards to spectators.


The authors search for the phenomenon of hooliganism. When did such events occur for the first time? Is there a clear sociological profile for hooligans? What is the influence of alcohol and drugs? And why do racism and neo-nazism have such attraction? The authors sketch the ‘side’ with its leaders, symbols and slogans. They also trace the patterns of violent outbursts and argue which initiatives for prevention, such as stewarding, are worthwhile.